Yoko1 puts it better than I did.
From what we know so far of the MCAS debacle, it appears that numerous individuals made decisions that, in the context of their particular view of the problem, seemed reasonable at the time. It was only after the sum total of those decisions came together at a certain place and time that the systematic failure became obvious.
I had suggested that it could have been just one person making a vital decision about say, the use of one vane. It's going to be hard to build a true picture of such scenarios.
Such clear memories for me.
Now we have minimum experience pilots flying aircraft with the same basic DNA as the early transports, who are facing the same issues as 1960s pilots did without the proper training to deal with them.
I sat for over a year with new captains on the 1-11. Many of them came direct from piston engined aircraft. On average, and mostly exactly true was the fact that some of the most bewildering, often bizarre things occurred with the older experienced guys. Right at the beginning of the 'Independents' laying hands on jet transport aircraft, the crews being trained were mostly very experienced - largely from Viscount and Britannia fleets. One example vital procedure they had to accept was maintaining what seemed a low speed after engine failure post V1. On one occasion the skipper let the speed build up, and the very green training guy for some reason thought things looked okay-ish.
An engineer handed the chaps some twigs. Leafy ones. They were in the Undercarriage doors or maybe the wheels, not sure. Anyway, they had dinner, grabbed a map and set off along the centreline.
The tree they'd hit was four miles from the runway.