Some interesting observations here ... if I may stir the pot just a little more ...
(a) GAMA style POHs which include various sorts of go/stop data ought to be viewed more as a serious admonition to stop rather than encouragement to go. One needs to keep in mind the very litigious environment within which the US manufacturers operate and consider their need to provide a measure of defence during litigation while not making their aeroplanes look too down market in the performance arena.
The pragmatic operational view in a light twin at high gross and density height is that it goes fine on two (some obviously better than others) and, on one, not too badly once it is cleaned up at altitude and on speed. Low and slow continuation of flight OEI, especially in the hands of a marginally proficient pilot in conditions requiring extremely critical flying, is an invitation to an eventual Vmca departure and a crash totally out of control. Far better, I suggest, to consider in such extreme circumstances a controlled forced landing with a moderate degree of available thrust to provide some choice of crash site.
(b) the 340, while being one of my fondest light twins, often is described in unflattering terms in respect of its reluctance to leave the ground. While the comments ascribed to a particular training organisation possibly make a lot of sense for that particular Type, I believe that it is dangerous to attempt to make the takeoff procedure too much of a rote sequence. Circumstances dictate appropriate procedure. The preferred procedure on a particular takeoff might well be quite undesirable for a different set of conditions. I guess that what I am saying is that
(i) many pilots receive inadequate instruction in asymmetric operation during their training
(ii) individual pilots need to read widely within competent literature to obtain a more detailed appreciation of the problems .. so that they are better able to make sensible decisions for particular circumstances.
(c) 5 degrees into the live (I do hope your post involved a typo) engine relates to Vmca determination limits in the certification process. For the normal continued climb at higher speeds, climb performance wings level is very similar to that achieved with 5 degrees bank ... there is little to be gained by making the flying somewhat harder by targeting the bank angle. However, a skilful pilot might squeeze just a little more climb out of the aircraft by using an intermediate bank angle sufficient to eliminate sideslip caused by the rudder force vector. This generally works out to be around 2-3 degrees into the live engine.
(d) one ought not just blindly climb ahead without very considerable thought to terrain problems. Again this must be part of the pre takeoff briefing process.
(e) in some circumstances, a failure a little below blue line might be handled better with a continuation. It all depends on the circumstances .. in this case the overrun environment compared to the terrain further out. Clearly, though, if the aircraft is at a decent weight and density height and the speed is much below blue line, then, in general, it is not going to go anywhere ... something about being between a rock and a hard place. Similarly, there may be circumstances where one would still abort from a speed above blue line. For instance, a takeoff from a very mountainous airstrip with close in good forced landing areas but high tiger country further out. Again .. horses for courses and an individual decision for an individual takeoff.
(f) I take the view that FAR25 performance is not necessarily a guarantee .. only information relating to specific conditions. The jet can easily find itself in circumstances where it may not be able to complete an OEI takeoff satisfactorily .. windshear being the most obvious.
(g) .. and, in all cases, there is little to be accomplished if undue haste in shutting down the engine involves shutting down the wrong one ....
[ 30 December 2001: Message edited by: john_tullamarine ]</p>