Item 1. 25.255 requires a maximum demonstrated out of trim of 3 seconds at applicable trim rate, that then will provide controllability for the pilot to manage the pitch to be able to pull 1.5 g with no more than a normal short term limit of force applied by a single pilot. The MCAS exceeded the trim rate applicable so that misses the target, available pitch to achieve g was not available, and it appears the force applied comes from two pilots, in excess of the single pilot short term force...
Item 2. Whatever it is called, MCAS was a SAS system, and the consequences from a failure of any SAS system, as well as the warning/alert seem to be way off the mark IMHO.25. 672
If pitch control is inconsequential then there is no problem. The smoking hole in the ground suggests that is not the case.
FDR you have totally misinterpreted the reason for the requirement contained in FAR25.255.
This standard was developed to address the "jet upset" problems experienced in the early days of jet transports.
The problem was seen as either insufficient elevator power, or stabilizer jack stalling as a result of deliberately or inadvertently applied longitudinal trim.
The regulation required that a defined level of stability and control was available if the mis-trim was:
1. 3 seconds at the no load trim rate;
2. 30 lbf stick force for manual trim:
3. The maximum trim which could be applied by the autopilot before it disconnected due to overload.
Each FAR standard is written as a stand alone requirement, you cannot try to apply a requirement written about mis-trimming to an event which is clearly about a control runaway.
The appropriate paragraphs for B737 stabilizer malfunctions are 25.671, 672 and 677.
Unless you are experienced in interpreting these requirements you may have difficulty working out what is really required.
Please don't forget to read the appropriate AC's as well.
It may also be helpful to read the equivalent paras of FAR 23 and AC 23-8.
I know these are for light aircraft but the guidance material about runaways is more comprehensive, it may give you an idea of how the FARs may be interpreted.
They will also give you some information about control open loop/closed loop recognition delay times used for malfunctions/runaways
You have next to no chance of working out what was required for certification or what tests were made without, copies of all certification meeting minutes, the agreed means of demonstrating compliance and the compliance reports for each FAR standard.
Unfortunately the FAR certification standards, as written, can be just the beginning of a long and complex path before all parties actually agree to the test required and the results expected.