fdr,
Clarifying my point, scepticism that the Max can be flown safely, has nothing to do with MCAS.
If the trim, for whatever reason, exceeds a particular deviation then the likelihood of being able to recover is low. This is based on the two accidents and questionable, but likely correct simulation of the stick / trim forces in the NG.
The debate about training only arises if the regulatory authorities accept a pilot contribution in recognising a trim runway and disabling the electrics before the critical deviation is reached; either short term dispensation (NG) or as a contribution in a long term modification.
As currently configured, and again based on the accidents, the likelihood of crew correctly assessing a runway situation and switching the system off in time is low.
There is no alert of trim runway, thus the situation has to be deduced from other cues which might themselves be distracting or not appreciated quickly enough to maintain control.
The judgement of the acceptability of the current position depends on regulatory views on achieving consistent human performance, without which an accident might ensue.