Originally Posted by
gums
Salute!
Originally Posted by
gums
Salute!
No need for an AoA indicator to trim. Not even in the shuttle.
Gums sends...
Gums sends...
Originally Posted by
petit plateau
If you are relying on control pressure as the input signal into the human, then are you not assuming it is a monotonic function ?
Isn't the point about the increased aero lift off the Max nacelles, that it transforms it into a non-monotonic function ..... ?
Originally Posted by
BDAttitude
Sorry for nitpicking, but
AFAIK we still have nothing but an educated guess about the nature of the certification issues being just a feel problem.
Or has this been confirmed somewhere by Boeing or the FAA?
In fact we have just learned that MCAS was originally designed to tackle a problem in high altitude accelerated stall conditions which is something that was not heard of before.
I would be the last to be supprised if the feel issue turns out to be somewhat an understatement.
My observation is that the two incidents and the subsequent investigations have uncovered a right old mess, with many many causes, so I am not at all disagreeing with you on that. As a systems engineer, who has written standards and been involved in certification (not of aircraft) around the world I am watching this with interest.
However my comment regarding the "no AoA required" is that they are being somewhat simplistic. The FAA requirement is presumably so that the normal pilot in pitch darkness with no external visual references, can still figure out what to do based upon normal behaviours. If however the aero-loads are such that this is a non-monotonic function, and that would appear to be the case for the Max based on the info so far, then those who are saying that an AoA indicator is unnecessary are missing the point in this instance. This FAA requirement is - as far as I can see - intended to give a pilot suitable cues that will not catch them out.