Originally Posted by
Bergerie1
yanrair,
My conclusion, therefore, is that normally flight crews should always obey the SOPs, even in an emergency, yet there may still be times when circumstances may dictate otherwise. Then, and only then, is it permissible and maybe essential to deviate, but this must be done in the full knowledge of ALL the implications. SOPs are for the guidance of wise men and not necessarily to be slavishly followed."
Not all flight managers act in the draconian manner that some posters here on Proone seem to think!
Complex situations that exceed the boundaries of SOP's and NNCL's/QRH/FCOM procedures happen. When the books are placed in the corner and the crew have to roll up their sleeves and deal with the real world, the value of the procedures that are now not necessarily being followed still exists; the very fact that the crew are electing to deviate means that there is a change in conditions outside of normal. If that is a result of error, or stress, interruption or other cause, the fact that what is happening is different is highlighted and that is a trigger for crew to contemplate. The vast majority of events that occur remain within the guidelines of the procedures that have been developed. Occasionally they go way outside. The stress of malfunctions is exacerbated by control difficulties, or where the warning systems are swamped by cascading alerts. The handling stuff goes back into the past, there may be a bit of wishful thinking about better performance in the old days, there were many examples of tragic loss of flight control in the past, not so dissimilar to the most recent events. One concern in many of the events is that getting out of sorts, many events have data showing full back stick being applied contrary to a rational recovery from the loss of control condition. That includes 1st world top flight programs as well as other operations with less stellar reputations. Not too many aircraft will survive a continuous back stick input (notwithstanding the MCAS saga's) in a stall or departure. When the data shows roll rates over 180 degrees a second on a Part 25 aircraft, there is a hint that not all was well in the handling dept. Point is, humans in stressful situations have a wide range of performance outcomes in dealing with the issues confronting them. The industry had the sober lesson of SR111, which showed that disciplined methodical process may not always be the best option.
With the level of operation, I would think that the industry overall doesn't do a bad job dealing with abnormal conditions; for the number of events that occur every day the wild rides while distressing are not a great rate of occurrence, the problem is the consequential impact to the individuals concerned.