Originally Posted by
yoko1
I think the more germane question is whether anyone actually realized that a single-point failure had been introduced into the design after all the modifications. It appears that there were too many chefs with a hand in the MCAS design and no one stepping back to give it a thorough top to bottom review. We would like to think that during the design phase someone would have seen what has now become obvious to everyone, but given the time pressures and compartmentalization built into the process, I can also see how this might have been missed.
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It would have to been an oversight at original design of the software
That oversight would have to have been missed by whatever peer review process is invoked within Boeing
Missed when drafting submission for Certification
Missed by Certifying authority
Missed by Boeing when quantum of movement changed (speed/extent of stabiliser deflection) (to be fair this is probably the point at which it would have been least likely to have been spotted)
That's a lot of misses it seems to me. Your question is VERY pertinent and this Human Factors element of the investigation will be interesting to unpick