Ed, this forum is open presumably in the furtherance of aviation centric matters, which include safety, design, operation and training as some aspects. Opinion flows relatively freely and that freedom results in all views being presented, the loudest and most persistent being accorded column inches on the page.
The industry overall works, it has bad days and they are catastrophic for the people concerned, but less so for the industry at large. Passengers and shareholders have voted with their check books to drive the industry in the direction it has gone. That direction has resulted in an explosion of capacity, routes and frequencies, resulting in a demand for flight crew that places pressure on supply of trained personnel. Training standards meet financial bottom lines every day. The regulatory system has been under stress for a long time, and competition for competent staff places strain on the regulator capacity. They cope, as does everyone else.
The OEM is also in a competitive industry, and deals as best they can to produce a product that can compete. The engineers doing design have firewalls to assure the ODA DOA process remains functional. For the MCAS it appears to have slipped a cog. Each part of the system includes humans working under stress, and making deliberations under uncertainty. If we miss out in the imagination to cover all eventualities in a failure mode analysis before the fact, then that is the limit of being human.
Blaming flight crew for not being competent in a dynamic complex event does not improve the long term system reliability. Blaming a 200hr FO, or a 4000hr Capt for not being chuck yeager does not cure the problem. Simplifying procedures through strengthened risk analysis, and better system design flowing from more robust faikure mode analysis is a path forward but doesn't happen quickly. The industry will put a bandaid on the problem with specific fault mitigating training, and that will do in the short term along with better event centric rectification.
The training for all conceivable and inconceivable events for the crew doesn't get done within the cost base of the industry as it stands.
This forum has had numerous comments decrying the competency of the flight crew in these events, contending they are primary causation of the outcome. It is unfair to do that in this case IMHO, and beyond that, the assumption of goodness in those that consider that the fault would have been easy for a competent crew to deal with is potentially a risky assumption. We can hope that following comprehensive review, system redesign,the training that results will increase the likelihood of a successful outcome by any flight crew, not just the Yeagers out there. At that point, if the crew cannot cope with the same problem, then there is a possible crew issue. Before that point, the failure is global. The ability of training reinforcement to mitigate operational risks has a patchy record, we still plant planes in the rough at both ends of the runway, from all cultures and nationalities.