Boofhead; "The aircraft does meet all regulatory requirements, the MCAS system was provided to...."
nonsense.
The aircraft did not meet the rules under Subpart D, and that is the underlying issue. The general comments to date have been related to Subpart C, as there is a failure of the rules to provide adequate protection, just as was the case with AA587, where what was assumed by the industry was not so in reality. In all cases, a situation that requires both pilots on the controls to recover is not compliant, nor is having loads that exceed the momentary force loads to be applied by a single pilot, nor is it acceptable for the aircraft to require exceptional skill or strength.
(c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any other automatic or power-operated system—
(1) The airplane is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations that is critical for the type of failure being considered;
must permit initial counteraction of failures of the type specified in §25.671(c) without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the system, or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense.
and my favorite
(a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems.
Boof', you mention having control issues, so have I; I have landed a 4 engine aircraft without elevators, and I have landed an aircraft after a mid air collision. I don't believe that in either of those cases was it reasonable to have to rely on either the pilot skill or exceptionalism to survive. Both of those aircraft were military so the rules were different, however, after 20,000 additional hours on Boeings and Airbus, I don't believe that it is acceptable to rely on the pilots achieving something that has not been part of their training. Had they done so, then kudos, but don't shoot the messenger, the crews herein were the product of the training system that we have in the real world, and that is the way it is. It is not acceptable to assume that they would be a Chuck Yeager, Bob Hoover, Neil Williams or similar. What on earth do you expect from a 200hr co pilot in the way of support? What do you expect from a product of the current Part 61 syllabus, MCC shambles under FAR or EASA FCL? This is not regional, skin colour or religion based, we have just seen a fairly serviceable NG get seaplane time recorded, just as happens in Indonesia, Chukk, and various other places, including the Bahamas, etc.
The industry is adequate, not much better than that. You cannot bitch about a crew that is confronted with a complex issue that still confounds the manufacturer and regulator 9 months later, and state with a clear conscience that the problem begins and ends in the cockpit. If you show proof that the crew had been trained competently in runaway trim, of dealing with a stabiliser that was so far out of trim that it needed unloading to be reset, that the crew had sufficient altitude to unload a full nose down trim stab before impacting the ground, that the OEM told them of these latent defects in their aircraft design, that the airline had done so, that they had been checked to such a level?
I am angry; I am angry as I have flown Boeing products for nearly 40 years, and the only aircraft that had any discussion on stab airloads was not a Boeing. I have done out of envelope flight test of the B737 and was not aware of the issue. I am angry on behalf of the flight crew that you appear to assume should have skills well in excess of that trained and checked by the system. Personally, I have flown biplanes, WW2 aircraft, and heavy military singles as well as jets, I accept the constraints of those aircraft, as I now fly them as experimental, restricted or limited category, where the basis of their certification is understood by the words in the 21 Subpart H applicable statements. These aircraft do not provide the level of airworthiness that comes from Part 25, and that is fine.
Further comment:
The industry trains to a minimum standard, that is acceptable to the regulator. The airlines could train to higher standards, however, the competitive nature of the industry precludes undergoing astronaut type training for a regular line pilot. The line pilot gets to see components of a training matrix that covers the usual suspects, a fault with no FDE, faults with FDE and requiring reset of a system, faults that degrade performance, faults that degrade handling qualities. We get to practice ILS's which we do every day, and occasionally train on approaches that statistically end badly. We get to do RTO's, OEI's and the usual basics. Often these are assumed to be the limiting case but are not so. The pilots enter the system with varied background, from those that cleaned planes to go fly, or pumped gas for them, to those that the govt paid to do so, and those that could afford training by other funding. Sometimes the airlines HR department is the source of the feed stock and the processing of the new hire pilot. We see former military pilots in the same course as a baron pilot or a 200hr wet CPL/IR/ME ticket. The system trains these people to go fly low viz procedures down to CAT IIIB in short order, with LVTO and similar points of interest. The guys and girls generally do a credit to their background, and cope with what is thrown at them well. In many countries, they get paid less than subsistence wage and are or food stamps at that time. These people fly the high value payload, anyones loved ones from A to B in weather that includes thunderstorms, squalls, snow, hail, rain and shine. They turn up and undergo training as provided by the company. They are not responsible for what the company trains them on, they are the recipient of the training. If there is a deficiency in their training, don't blame the dead crew in the bottom of the smoking hole for not being trained to a level that would ensure that they can cope with unknown and unexpected events.
Every day around the world, the system generally works. It could be better, but making it better is not the responsibility of the 200hr copilot or 4000 Captain, they are the result of the system not the cause. If you are able to deal with every situation that may come along, then great for you. A number of pilots can do that, many will get close, and many won't deal with situations that have not been trained.
38 years of safety and accident investigation in the military and airlines, and the main takeaway IMHO is to keep things simple, and to understand that crews faced with events often do not respond as they do in the simulator.