The plus side of such old technology is that it is tested and proven, but then two crash due to software bugs.
Someone on one of the threads said, MCAS did what it was supposed to do. This could only be correct if one accepts it was indeed a flawed program. I'll go on a moment from an almost philosophical viewpoint.
I don't look upon this issue as 'bugs' per se, it is more a fundamental inadequacy in programming logic. If I understand correctly, the main issue was that the system can allow the failure of a solitary measuring device to become potentially 'catastrophic' by triggering inputs to the most powerful control surface, and that its jackscrew inputs go too far, too fast.
The UAS etc., are just further miserable consequences, but the above is the prime issue.
The cold reality is that if this aircraft had used three vanes, or had a comparator with logical 'most likely' decision-making, it would probably have flown for decades without even being realised. Sadly, the 'lessons learned' are pretty certain to be the most expensive in aviation history.
However, when you analyse the overall picture, the fact that it's a double catastrophe is as much a part of a bewildering coincidence as it is of what I termed the prime programming issues. The Vane failures are almost certainly very different technically. Boeing doesn't make the AoA Vanes.