The report by NZ's TAIC (Transport Accident Investigation Commission) was released yesterday NZT. I can't attach the link (being a newbie) but you can search for the NZ web site of TAIC, then search for the report "AO-2015-007".
NZ's CAA (Civil Avation Authority) has been slated for not acting on known deficiencies for some operators.
Here is a summary of their findings (Quote):
"5.1. The helicopter struck the glacier surface with a high forward speed and a high rate of descent, with the engine delivering power.
5.2. Throughout the flight, the all-up weight of the helicopter almost certainly exceeded the maximum permitted weight.
5.3. It is unlikely that mechanical failure with the helicopter was a factor in the accident. Although not all of the wreckage was recovered, an examination of the recovered components (including all the dynamic assemblies) revealed no pre-existing failure.
5.4. The tail rotor servo had exceeded the maximum flight hours permitted before overhaul, although that was unlikely to have been a contributory factor.
5.5. The weather conditions on the day were unstable and unsuitable for conducting a scenic flight. The localised weather conditions in the area were very likely to have been frequently below the minimum criteria required by the Civil Aviation Rules.
5.6. It is very likely that when the helicopter took off from Chancellor Shelf and descended down the valley the pilot’s perception of the helicopter’s height above the terrain was affected by one or more of the following conditions:
- cloud, precipitation, flat light conditions, condensation on the helicopter’s front windscreen.
5.7. The pilot had not been properly trained and did not have the appropriate level of experience expected under the operator’s categorisation scheme to fulfil the role and responsibilities expected of a senior (A-category) pilot in this type of operation.
5.8. The operator’s system for training its pilots was ill-defined and did not comply fully with the Civil Aviation Rules.
5.9. The operator’s training system did not have sufficient oversight by the designated senior persons. This was a factor that allowed the pilot to be assigned roles and responsibilities without the proper training and experience.
5.10. The Civil Aviation Authority had identified significant and repetitive non-compliance issues with the operator’s training system and managerial oversight that warranted intervention long before this accident occurred." (unquote)
The Squirrel A350 had 7 POB, including pilot and 2 pax in front left double seat. All died, RIP.