well in hindsight, when one's aircraft is trying to head to the ground and pull forces are exceeding the crew's ability, one might try to think of other ways to raise the nose, on some airplanes speedbrakes tend to pitch the aircraft up, flaps as well...the pilots were in a ****-fight to save the airplane, without having a clue what was happening to them, unfortunately ab initio programs do not seem to prepare "pilots" for any eventuality that doesn't come with a checklist.. and this where the unforgiveable failure of Boeing to present the info to the crews comes into play, for not designing a proper procedure to deal with a potentially very disorienting failure, not insisting on proper training and recognition of such, and for designing a single-point of failure system for stability augmentation in the first place....yes it is a stability augmentation system, nothing to do with stall avoidance...goodness, the short-bodied MerlinIII I flew 35 years ago had the same system, as well as did the Piper Cheyenne II, but their systems were imposing the downforce on the elevator circuit as opposed to trimming the stab, even on the little airplane we had a checklist, and were trained to deal with the system going haywire..