The following questions appear to be unanswered, by Boeing or anyone else.
1. Where did giving MCAS authority for such a large tailplane deflection come from? Flight test? The WSJ article hints at no. Wind tunnel data? If so, reducing the MCAS authority doesn't change the underlying data of why MCAS was allowed to do what it has been doing. How can we trust the "fix" if we don't know how the pre-fix condition came to be?
2. Why is such a simple yet important sensor as the AoA failing at such a high rate? Even without the MCAS, the AoA failure activates the stick shaker, not a simple "buzz" simulating buffeting but a rattle like a hardware store paint sticker -- a serious crew distraction. For all of the talk about AoA disagree lights being optional and the need for 3 AoAs, shouldn't the failure of even a single AoA be exceedingly rare? Are people seriously thinking of bird-strike damage? Is there lax quality control as suggested by the Air Force rejecting delivery of Boeing tankers? Some defect in the wiring?