“We don’t want to rush and do a crappy job of fixing the right things and we also don’t want to fix the wrong things,” Mr. Sinnett said, later adding, “For flight-critical software, I don’t think you want us to rush, rush it faster.”
Ummm, if you want me to go fly that thing and it has an issue with a "flight critical" item, well yes, yes I do want you to rush the fix. And if you fix a few things along the way that do not need fixing well that's OK too. Because if, for God's sake you send me out in an airplane with a critical or fatal flaw in a piece of flight-critical software and it goes south I am going to be very unimpressed. Full Stop.
If accurate that recording is going to cost Boeing billions in damages and may end the MAX program for all time, cast under a cloud of suspicion regarding its certification from within which it cannot escape.
The reason??
Sinnett is tacitly admitting months prior to the ET crash that there is "something" that needs "fixing" on the MAX in a flight critical system. This as a part of his argument that the airplane should keep on flying.
If your jaw didn't hit the floor read it again.
"That left fetzer valve switch?? Well we placarded it against any use with a warning that "Flipping this switch may result in your death" because we weren't sure what it does or how it works. After all, if you really needed it you'd know what it was and why it was there right?? But whatever, if you do accidentally hit that switch just use these other two nifty switches over here to stop the bad behavior. You do that and all will end well."
Uh huh...
Cheers-
dce