Hi Chug - it’s taken a very helpful PM, from someone else 😉, for me to understand that we may be arguing at cross purposes.
My view is that Service Inquiry Presidents are able to remain objective, but I agree that the wider implications of their reports are not necessarily identified and acted upon. I also think that it isn’t clear where a specific SI ends and a ‘wider implcation’ starts.
As I wasn’t there for the Cunningham SI I cannot say why (or if) the President invoked the clause in his TORs where it is addressed what he must do if he considers the MAA itself to be at fault. He may have tried and failed - I don’t know.
A useful (for me) analogy is provided by The Cunningham case - wherein the report it clearly states that RAFAT personnel were falsifying records. Not VSOs, squadron personnel. When I read the report (and ergo the Panel would long ago have gone back to their primary duties) I couldn’t see any alternative but Courts Martial. That didn’t happen. Are we to blame the Panel for not chasing that up or should we have relied upon the C-O-C? I would argue that anyone who submitted a final report in the knowledge that he or she was probably triggering Courts Martial within RAFAT had probably remained objective and not swayed by governance. I’m sure others will argue that it’s an indicator that we go after the little man and will find some way of justifying the behaviour itself!
I wish you well.
Orca.