Cows,
‘… what else slipped through the regulatory net? ‘
Like the inability to recover the aircraft after a trim runaway - this is not changed by MCAS cutout - problem as per Bend alot #64. Reduced confidence in the procedure after the accidents and sim demo. The drill depending on pilot recognition and timely action, and a complicated ‘yo-yo’ manoeuvre.
This relates to an industry wide question of how much credit can be taken for human involvement in rare or surprising situations. Then the insolvable debate about training; those who can, those who can’t, and those who think they can, but do not perform at the critical time because the situation is not recognised or too difficult (where’s the ‘trim fail’ light).
Another ‘slip’ is the AoA display on EFIS. With AoA failure the gauge displays may not be removed, crews cannot determine which one is accurate - hazardous misleading information.
Also, why have a separate AoA display when the same information is shown overlaying the EFIS speed scale, that scale is associated with more meaningful dual cross-monitoring IAS (ADC) Disagree alert.
Unnecessary display clutter.