Originally Posted by
Cows getting bigger
Ok, the single AOA gauge failed.
MCAS behaved as designed, including winding-in 2.5 units at a time rather than the 0.6 ‘sold’ to the regulator.
Contrary to CFR25.671, the failure of a flight control system was not manifested to the crews via a warning system. (Arguable whether MCAS is an FCS but since it unilaterally shifts a big flight control surface to get its job done......)
The crews did not disable MCAS by using the pedestal switches.
The certified out of trim case is for 3 seconds of trim input. That MCAS had 10 seconds at a time, with a rinse and repeat cycle should have caught the attention of the certification group, but it did not (hopefully that is...). Even then, all could have been saved had the crews been aware of the propensity of the MCAS to mimic a HAL9000 moment. The crews were in the dark, and the last x,000 posts indicate the extent of the darkness that existed and still remains.
8 months post event, and in the comfort of arm chairs this matter still raises debate. None of the commenters are at risk of life and limb making their comments, deliberations and judgements. The flight crew were faced with system behaviour that was not comprehended, and which put them quite quickly into the severe out of trim condition that the aircraft needs a recovery procedure that was occasionally taught in the dark ages in earlier times, but doesn't come out in clear language in the FCTM, or in any current training that the crews would have received.
Frankly, the crews were let down by the industry on all sides, from the regulator, manufacturer, and the following information and training provided to them. Some crews may have survived this through exceptional headwork and flying skills, but that is not the basis of system reliability or even permitted to be relied upon under the certification of Part 25 aircraft.
The industry is what we have ended up with, due to the commercial imperatives. Overall, it is a disjointed, fractionated and irrational system in many respects, managed as fiefdoms by the avrious countries and with nonsensical requirements akin to removing spurs before alighting the cockpit. The passengers have achieved the outcome of low cost tickets, governments have their regulatory bodies pushing nonsensical changes to programs from their court jesters, and there is a fundamental shortfall of competency in the global regulatory bodies. There are good people in there, one or two good ones are going to get slammed over the Max8 and that is the consequence of the workloads and management of the systems we now have guiding the industry.
Low cost doesn't mean no cost, it gets paid in various currencies, including blood sadly.
In our own neck of the woods, we have a regulator that has just completed making a system that was weird but functional into an updated incomprehensible one, that is unable to be complied with, and where the undermanning of the regulator means that the simple processes that should be 30 minutes take 60 days or more to complete. Hot on the heals of this painful transition of a Part, the system now intends to wreak the same havoc on larger aspects of operations and maintenance, such that the whole sectors of the industry are alarmed at the inability to achieve compliance or to make the more restrictive processes function. In the period between the demonstrated disastrous transition of a part of the regulations, to the impending major changes, the regulator has continued to bleed skill and manpower; dark clouds mass on the horizon. Change management is a risk management process, and we seem to be dropping the ball at present.