Orca
I do wonder (if I’ve got this right) whether a 22 year old ruling is relevant to the everyday activities within the UK Air Forces?
It is, if it has been enforced and upheld regularly, has led directly to avoidable deaths, and the regulatory authority still briefs against those who insisted on doing the right thing (i.e. met legal obligations instead of obeying orders not to). I’ve said before, the day MoD/MAA admits this ruling is wrong, is the day I’ll happily walk away. It refuses, and you’ve got to ask why. Who benefits?
Is the MAA really that bad? Does the system actually lead to more fatals than any other?
Chug mentioned the Red Arrows’ Cunningham case. The Service Inquiry report, issued by the MAA, sets out the MAA’s direct involvement in a root cause. That was a bit of a shock because hitherto I’d have said theirs was an oversight failure. Had warnings been heeded and regulations followed, neither the inadvertent ejection nor the release mechanism jamming would have occurred. The MAA provided the Prosecution’s ‘star witness’ (Prosecution’s words) in the certain knowledge the allegation against Martin-Baker was false, and MoD was sitting on the information it claimed never to have had, but had instructed staff not to use it. That’s not an allegation. The video is there for all to see, in addition to written and verbal evidence. And precisely the same maintenance error killed Flt Lt Simon Burgess in a Hawk in 1996. (Funny how no-one mentions that). Additionally (and luckily no fatalities) the same Type Airworthiness Authority was responsible for Air Cadet Gliders.
Can you point at one risk today (prob of x impact of) that is greater because of ‘the system’ or any system...just to help me out and contextualise the point?
I know what you mean, but I’m not sure MoD uses such a ‘risk score’ anymore? The same Red Arrows case illustrated that it populated the risk register with known standing risks only after the accident. So, the standing risk (certainty) of MoD managing airworthiness poorly remains; and one would be justified in thinking it worse
in certain areas given the Hawk teams didn’t have valid safety cases, even after ‘rigorous’ MAA audit. However, admittedly, one project team involved sought to correct this in 2014 by issuing a tender to provide 62 (sixty-two) safety cases and certifications for safety equipment alone – including the Tornado main parachute. I should emphasise that I do not wish to denigrate MAA staff here – it is a very few senior staff whose default position is to deny and deflect. Why do otherwise sane men act this way? I see them as almost political posts, divorced from the reality of day-to-day safety management. Certainly, they pay no heed to the Military Covenant.
Are the accusations (backed by facts or otherwise) about RAF officers analogous to similar situations in the RN and AAC?
The legal reviews (and Government acceptance of them) speak for themselves. Unfortunately, the few are allowed to judge their own case. To them, I’d add certain senior civilians who were given prior warnings (same as those given to Ministers, above). Their names are well-known. I cannot speak for the AAC.
The RN? Different beast to the RAF (from my viewpoint). Same excellent engineering training, but far less of an admin bias. (I’ve never known the RN to issue an edict that all administrative grades are senior to any engineer. Quickly jumped on and rescinded, but it was the same senior officers who were gleefully shutting down airworthiness management at the same time, and this was an attempt to shut down the engineers who were complaining). The ‘savings at the expense of safety’ policy of June 1987 arguably still persists. One need only point to what would have negated 95% of BoI/SI recommendations. RAF engineers railed against the policy, as did the Director of Flight Safety and, for example, FONAC. But the Senior Service doesn’t escape altogether. When IPTs were reformed in 1999, the very first question put to the Sea King IPTL, a senior RN Captain, was whether a mandated airworthiness policy, whose sole aim was to resolve safety critical problems ASAP, would be implemented. He immediately said NO. No hesitation. (He didn’t understand the question but wouldn’t admit it). He was ignored and contracts let, but some were cancelled by a non-engineer deputy to save money. Their primary output? A maintained Build Standard and safety case, without which one cannot sign the Master Airworthiness Reference.
And, of course, the ASaC Board of Inquiry you mention set out in great detail a raft of airworthiness failings. (Again, the likes of Chug and I are not alleging anything; merely quoting MoD itself, adding what has been omitted and pointing out linkages and recurrences). But it did not say they had been identified in 1994-6, contracts let to mitigate them, and cancelled by the same non-engineer. Not replaced with an alternative risk mitigation strategy. Just cancelled, as he said they weren’t risks in the first place so couldn’t materialise. They did, on 22 March 2003. The Board’s 3 main contributory factors wholly coincided with these known risks. When the President was advised by a family member, he claimed a ‘lack of involvement’; begging the question who
was involved, if not the President. I know how you feel Orca – I knew 3 of them myself, and found it difficult explaining all this to the mother and father of a 4th. It’s 46 years since I first had to notify a family (I didn’t know) of a death in person, but explaining it for hours in fine detail is infinitely more difficult. Others may disagree, but either way it’s a crap task. I was asked to do this by their MP, as he (Sir Roger Gale) instinctively knew they’d been lied to. Again, by just a few, but that’s all it takes.The book being discussed here explains direct links to the Tornado ZG710 shootdown the following day. Same people, same decisions. MoD continues to support these actions.
Hope this helps.