Hi Chug, Tuc,
I lost mates in the 849 crash - but I do wonder (if I’ve got this right) whether a 22 year old ruling is relevant to the everyday activities within the UK Air Forces?
Is the MAA really that bad? Does the system actually lead to more fatals than any other?
Can you point at one risk today (prob of x impact of) that is greater because of ‘the system’ or any system...just to help me out and contextualise the point?
Are the accusations (backed by facts or otherwise) about RAF officers analogous to similar situations in the RN and AAC?
I’m coming at this from a (probably historically inaccurate) perspective of there once being a time where aircraft seemed to be raining to the ground and I can’t think of a Typhoon accident as a case study, or a C-17...or a non camera related Voyager...you get the point.
I can assure you (FWIW and without being able to prove it) that I am one of few who have read every single syllable of the Nimrod Review - as opposed to being one of those that trots out the ‘post Haddon-Cave’ war cry as part of any sentence to do with risk.
Just want to understand the issue wrt everyday, modern day, ops of the RAF, FAA and AAC.
Many thanks.
Orca.