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Boeing 737 MAX Changes: FAA Targets May 23 Regulator Consultation
Apr 24, 2019 Sean Broderick | Aviation Daily
WASHINGTON—FAA is targeting May 23 for a meeting of global regulators to discuss finalized updates to Boeing’s 737 MAX flight control system, the agency confirmed to Aviation Week.
While much remains up in the air, the gathering is expected to include regulators from around the world, a source with knowledge of the agency’s plans said. Invitations to regulators are in the process of going out, and most—including representatives from Brazil, Canada, China, Ethiopia, Europe, and Indonesia—are expected to participate.
“The FAA is inviting the directors general of civil aviation authorities around the world to discuss the agency’s activities toward ensuring the safe return of Boeing 737 MAX to service,” an agency spokesperson told Aviation Week Apr. 24. “The meeting is intended to provide participants the FAA’s safety analysis that will inform its decision to return the 737 MAX fleet to service in the U.S. when the decision is made. Also, the FAA will provide safety experts to answer any questions participants have related to their respective decisions to return the fleet to service.”
A source with knowledge of the FAA’s thinking said the agency views the meeting as part of an effort to build global consensus to remove flight restrictions put in place, but not part of its own process to determine whether the MAX should return to U.S. skies.
Using the meeting to spotlight the MAX changes hinges on FAA approving Boeing’s updated maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) software and related training. FAA is preparing to conduct certification test flights of the proposed final software configuration—the follow-on to Boeing’s Apr. 16 engineering demonstration flight. If FAA signs off on the system’s performance, the next steps would include approving the complete software package, including documentation. FAA has not received the final package.
Training that accompanies the new configuration also must be approved. An FAA-organized Flight Standardization Board (FSB) has recommended computer-based training to explain MCAS—which was added to the MAX’s speed trim system as a flight-stability function to make the new model handle like the 737 Next Generation—to pilots. But some airlines and regulators are expected to push for a minimum amount of simulator training. One possibility being floated: a compromise that mandates simulator training within a certain timeframe, but not as a precursor to flying the MAX. This would allow airlines to work MCAS scenarios into planned simulator training sessions, minimizing training disruption. Public comments on the FSB are due at the end of April, and are expected to be considered during production of a final report, which would set the MAX’s minimum training standards.
If approval of the modified MCAS’s functionality, underlying software, and related training minima is in place before the May meeting, FAA is not expected to wait long after the session to remove its MAX ban. FAA issued its ban Mar. 13—three days after the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, the second 737 MAX 8 accident in five months, and after all non-U.S. MAX operations were prohibited by other regulators. The moves left all 370 in-service MAXs grounded until further notice.
MCAS and how pilots responded to the system’s erroneous operation are at the center of each probe. Boeing determined MCAS, which commands automatic stabilizer trim, needed modifications following the first accident, the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610.
Most airlines with MAXs have removed them from flight schedules well into the summer, opting for a predictable schedule that does not include MAXs over a tentative one that cancels flights as the grounding drags on. Meanwhile, Boeing is working to build a consensus among operators—some of which grounded the aircraft voluntarily. The key constituency being targeted: pilots.
“We think a key voice in all of this will be the pilots for our airlines,” Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg said on the company’s first-quarter earnings call Apr. 24. “We’re working with our airline customers and those pilot voices to ensure that we can build on that going forward. To that end, we hosted multiple sessions around the world; more than 90% of our 50-plus MAX operators to date have had pilots in our simulator sessions with the new software ... I can tell you with those series of sessions that we’ve had around the world, the pilot feedback from the simulator sessions has been excellent.”
While most airlines and pilot groups continue to express general confidence in Boeing and the MAX, specific reactions to the updates have been more reserved. “United pilots have a seat at the table and will closely monitor these changes to ensure they fully and effectively mitigate all identified risks and meet the needs of our pilots to regain full confidence in the MAX,” the airline’s master executive council told its pilots following a meeting at FAA earlier this month.
For Boeing, winning pilots over will mean convincing them that the company has learned from how MCAS’s introduction was handled. While Boeing insists it did not hide MCAS—the system was included in high-level technical briefings to operators, for instance—the flight-control law’s existence was not proactively communicated to pilots. Boeing expected it to operate in the background, and only if certain areas of the flight-envelope were encountered. MCAS was not explained in flight manuals, nor was it covered in MAX-specific training.
The sequence in each MAX accident exposed a failure mode that triggered MCAS with one source of inaccurate data, pushing the aircraft’s nose down and forcing the crew to counter with nose-up inputs to keep it airborne. The sequences also suggested that all flight crews were not sufficiently prepared to a failure scenario linked to the system. Boeing did not proactively explain MCAS and highlight the existing emergency procedure to manage it—executing the stabilizer runaway checklist—until after the Lion Air accident.
“Boeing will, and should, continue to face scrutiny of the ill-designed MCAS and initial non-disclosure of the new flight control logic,” Southwest Airlines Pilots Association President Jon Weaks said in a message to pilots following the Apr. 12 FAA meeting.
Boeing says its software upgrades reduce the likelihood of an erroneous activation, while training and manual updates will shed more light on MCAS.
“Both accidents were a chain of events. One link in that chain of events was the activation of the MCAS system with erroneous angle-of-attack data,” Muilenburg said. “We understand how to address that link. That’s our responsibility. We own that and that’s what the software update does.”