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Old 23rd Apr 2019, 16:56
  #88 (permalink)  
MurphyWasRight
 
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Originally Posted by meleagertoo
"Blandness"

It is surely essential that checklists and ADs are bland, that is part of their nature. It is not appropriate to used nuanced language in these, just bare statements of fact. It is up to pilots to nuance them, where they do it in crewroom discussion or in flight.
The AD following the Lionair accident has been criticised for understating the effects and environment caused by the associated additional warnings, a 'mere' list of contrary indications, stick shaker, apparently unconnected warnings etc understating the confusion and bedlam of the real event.
Guys, we're Professional pilots, it's up to us to use our Professional systems knowlege and imagination to read past Boeing's list of cold facts to picture what the reality is like. It is most certainly not appropriate for Boeing to go injecting emotions or human preceptions/reactions into a checklist.
Surge-Limit-Stall doesn't start with 'If there's a big scary noise from the engine that makes you jump...' does it? Where is the nuanced language in the V1 reject actions? Or a rapid depressurisation? It's just a list of facts. If you're not imaginative enough to read between the lines and visualise and prepare for the BANG! and WHOOOSH! deafening noise and agonising barotrauma that might go with it then stick to reading the daily mail on a train, why would/should Boeing patronise you with emotional language?


To be fair I suspect most of those calling for such explanations aren't Professional pilots. At least, I sure hope so!
My bolding in above quote.

Totally agree that emotional language has no place in a checklist.

However proficiency at reading between the lines might be especially difficult for pilots with English as a second language,certainly hard to test for.

I believe that lack of systems knowledge is a key issue, to train and test the ability to apply it in real situations is a thorny problem.
It is probably up there with lack practice of manual flying skills as real concerns.
.
The 'blandness' comment on the emergency AD had to do with the possible attempt to minimize the MCAS issue to maintain the claim that existing procedures were sufficient.
What was missing was the clear 'list of facts' and actions, with some of the critical items presented as a note at the end.

I am not at all a pilot but have a lot of experience in analysing problems from an outsider viewpoint.
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