"the system (MCAS) is only needed to enhance stability with slats and flaps retracted at very light weights and full aft center of gravity (CG). The aircraft exhibits sufficient natural longitudinal stability in all other parts of the flight envelope without the MCAS to meet the rules"
My understanding was it also was only "needed" at low speeds and a high AoA!
Interesting that the statement says "and full aft C of G" and not just an aft C of G.
The new "fix" seems to be anything happens and MCAS will shut down, even an accidental blip of the trim switch.
So therefore after any, of the many possible events MCAS will not work and the aircraft will not have sufficient natural longitudinal stability.
So now in the cheese mix, we are slow (without lift devices of slats and flaps), a high AoA, light (move manoeuvrable) and an aft C of G. MCAS kicks in, as the nacelles are about to supply more pitch up effect - a fraction of a second later the pilot knocks the trim switch and MCAS disengages - a slight extra back pressure now and the holes are all there as we have "insufficient longitudinal stability".
I think that due to the heat in the kitchen caused by the crashes and the stubbornness to exclude the fact training both on (system and flight characteristics) is required this "safety back up system" will basically be removed by being shut down when you actually need it. MCAS should be there to help when there are all ready a few pieces of cheese on the plate such as a high AoA with a aft C of G - not the time for the control column to become a feather.