I think a lot of peoples opinions can ignore the reality. The concept that the enemy could always up his game to meet the difficulties in shooting down better bombers and defeating countermeasures was regularly spouted by the knuckle-draggers that infected various levels of Allied technical intelligence in WW2. Reginald Victor Jones CH, CB, CBE, FRS, FRSE, LLD pointed out many of the gross errors in scientific tactics that were made, including the criminally delayed introduction of Window tactics on the pathetic assertion, by some, that the Germans would develop countermeasures and also use Window against the Allies and lose the effectiveness, which they did, but with very limited effect! But that false assertion cost thousands of Allied aircrew lives in the months of the Bombing offensive when Window was withheld. Likewise, to assert that the Germans had no need to counter the Mosquito bombing contribution is crass. The use of Nitrous-Oxide powerboosting illustrates the difficulties that the enemy faced in engaging fast and high flying bombers. The Mosquito itself, in nightfighter form used Nitrous oxide power boosting for the same purpose, to increase the speed advantage of the interceptor . The simple fact is, that Airborne Interception becomes exponentially more difficult as the speed advantage of the interceptor is reduced. For every single mph that the Allied bombers could increase their speed, ANY interceptor faces a lower chance of a successful intercept and it increases the time/distance taken for intercepts of otherwise similar geometry to occur, makes no difference if the nightfighter is an Me262, the faster bomber is less likely to be intercepted than a slower bomber. Rolling, your last sentence is also incorrect. OAP
The problem with this comment OAP is that the Germans were quite capable of rapidly changing how they dealt with countermeasures, which is exactly what they did after window was employed in 1943. Fighter Command had done trials with window in 1942 and it totally disrupted the effectiveness of A.I. Mk VII and Mk VIII (The 2 centimetric A.I. Radars under development and early production) plus everything that worked on 1.5 metres wavelength. It wasn't until A.I. Mk X (SCR 720) was trialled in early 1943 and found to be able to deal with the effects of Window that the decision to allow the use of Window over Hamburg in the July was made (around about the time that the first production A.I. Mk X's were going to be introduced into service). However the introduction of the radar was delayed and the equipment didn't actually become operational until January 1944. This however was just in time to allow Fighter Command to give the Luftwaffe a bit of a shoeing during the Baby Blitz, in which the Luftwaffe made heavy use of Duppel (as they called Window) and that did play havoc with the 1.5 metre band G.C.I. radars just as Fighter Command had feared. However there were enough centimetric G.C.I stations then available, along with the A.I. Mk X equipped Mossies and AAA batteries equipped with centimetric gun laying radars to literally decimated the German bomber force every time they launched an attack. What did the German's learn from Hamburg?? Well for starters it showed that the Himmelbett system was extremely wasteful in resources and there were better ways to get the night fighters into the Bomber Stream, like use the bombers own radar transmissions with homing systems like Flensburg (which worked against the Monica system extremely well) and Naxos (which was designed to track H2S, but wasn't so actuate), plus they rapidly build a radar using a lower frequency that was immune to the effects of Window designed to effect the earlier German Lichtenstein A.I. set which became the Lichtenstein SN2. None of those German countermeasures were exposed until a Ju-88 fitted with those systems landed at Woodbridge by mistake in July 1944. Yep Schräge Musik was most definitely a killer and the really strange thing is that the RAF had actually trailed such a weapon system in 1940 on a Havoc and the Defiant night fighters used almost such an attack method as a standard tactic.