PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - 737 AOA failure - System implications
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 16:49
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alf5071h
 
Join Date: Jul 2003
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737 Driver, an interesting viewpoint.

No FD, or none relevant to the situation.

The list should be restated with the appropriate level of alerting to add emphasis - tactile most salient, stick shake and control force, then flashing visual alerts, visual with audio repeat, visual or audio only.

The first to be discarded would probably be audio, then visuals as judged by relevance to the situation. Over time, perhaps stick shake in proportion to the increasing stick force, ultimately a single focus of attention - pull.

Subsequent activity probably subconscious, revert to basics - auto throttle and AP engage, FD(?), undo last switch action, backtrack seeking to identify a mistake, cause.

None of the the alerts actually identify the exact problem and action, nor might they post mod as described so far.

The two AoA vanes can be compared to provide a display of ‘AoA Disagree’ - currently an optional fit, but it would be of no value in resolving a vane AoA input problem, nor would it be of any benefit as a mandated post mod addition - similarly with AoA EFIS dial display.

Mind, memory, seven bits of information limit; little spare mental capacity due to surprise and continuing startle - because the corrective activity does not resolve the problem.

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