fizz57, whilst your points are valid as history, we cannot accept that the outcome of previous events correctly indicate or confirm the underlying risk. With the two Lion events, completely different outcomes, but before flight, before raising flap, exactly the same risk.
Thus we should consider what could be learnt from recent accidents. Avoiding focus on MCAS, but to consider the overall event; multiple alerts immediately after takeoff, a situation which 3 crews experienced and, based on outcome, one managed ‘safely’, but in the other two did the preceding situation contribute to the accident.
Before the MCAS problems, could the workload be reduced, improve checklists, appropriate training scenarios, surprise management, crew co-ordination, choice of options, and technical understanding.
There has been significant criticism in this forum in some of these areas; given that not all of this is from a professional viewpoint, there may still be safety issues worthy of discussion.