Originally Posted by
HarryMann
Don't necessarily agree...
Hardware failures have to be possible without disastrous effects or consequences.
Either the aircraft shouldn't require such a strange convoluted system for retaining stick force increase at the stall...
Or a system should be built in that is 'totally foolproof' in so far as meeting theoretical and practically tested fault paths or redundancy...
Or.. the airworthiness requirement should be waived with stall training and AoA alarms...
Theory being why would you normally be flying into a stall.. neither Lion Air or Ethiopean were or would have been near the stall.. the IRONY is an Airworthiness Requirement KILLED people, LOTS?
Lets ask this... how serious is a STRAIGHT stall if it's detected and countered formally (standard response) unless its a low level ?
Is the stick force ~alpha curve or stick force per G overrated as a design criteria ?
Correct : None of the aircraft where even close to a stall.
But the signals coming from the AOA sensors tricked the "aircraft" to "think" it was in a stall and corrective action had to be taken.
=> MCAS and stick shaker where activated to counter an issue that did not exist in the first place.
And now? ? They are going to "fix' this with a SOFTWARE UPDATE?
Let us start with a third AOA sensor, then start thinking about the software.