Originally Posted by
Vilters
You can update the software from now till eternity.
The main issue remains.
These "events" are triggered by failing AOA sensor/systems. => That is where the main focus should be => Why is the AOA probe/system failing.
That MCAS was single probe only is an error, but secondary and wat MCAS is/was trying to do is third.
But, and this should be the main focus point => With a solid AOA signal, nothing of this would have happened in the first place.
Don't necessarily agree...
Hardware failures have to be possible without disastrous effects or consequences.
Either the aircraft shouldn't require such a strange convoluted system for retaining stick force increase at the stall...
Or a system should be built in that is 'totally foolproof' in so far as meeting theoretical and practically tested fault paths or redundancy...
Or.. the airworthiness requirement should be waived with stall training and AoA alarms...
Theory being why would you normally be flying into a stall.. neither Lion Air or Ethiopean were or would have been near the stall.. the IRONY is an Airworthiness Requirement KILLED people, LOTS?
Lets ask this... how serious is a STRAIGHT stall if it's detected and countered formally (standard response) unless its a low level ?
Is the stick force ~alpha curve or stick force per G overrated as a design criteria ?