Based on what has been disclosed about the proposed changes, the lack of detail does not reassure or provide a convincing argument.
The somewhat obvious changes to system architecture - dual sensing, cross comparison, authority limits, and annunciation (still deficient), should have been in place for certification - thus ‘closing the stable door’. However, there is no reference as to why the AoA value was in error on two aircraft, involving 3 vanes.
Discussions have consided the physical vane, electrical output, software conversation, etc, but nowhere is there a description of why ‘on the day before’ everything was normal, but then the system malfunctioned.
Why were these two aircraft, on that day, so different from all of the other aircraft in service.
These aspects should be addressed by the formal investigations, as yet not disclosed publicly, but should be available to the manufacturer and regulator (but not all?). Software doesn’t leave ‘evidence’ at an accident site.
Returning the aircraft to service is more about public trust than with design and certification; all are required, worldwide. This requires much more detail to restore technical trust, even if the manufacturer believes that a public statement is sufficient.
Are we to accept - an analogy involving a car manufacturer after an accident where the steering-rod bolt fell out, being satisfied by fitting two bolts, but not knowing why the first bolt fell out.
So far the changes are a ‘wet blanket’ over an unidentified cause; can we be convinced that the problem is cured without knowing ‘cause’?