Originally Posted by
lomapaseo
I ask myself the question
Can the B737 max be flown safely with the proposed fixes ?
So what is left to talk about other than a systemic fix in the certification validation
I see a lot of people assume that all that needs to be done is for Boeing to implement the software changes or some other "quick fix". But it's actually is a bit more complicated than that. And part of the complication is in your first question. Can MAX be flown safely with the proposed fixes? The answer to that question is, according to whom? Proven by what procedure? FAA will need to see proof that the changes actually fix the problem. And since much of the certification process was "delegated" to Boeing, FAA may be forced to repeat a lot of those tests.
Second problem is the FBI involvement and DoT inquiry into the certification process. Those two are no longer concerned about the MCAS, they want to know how it got approved. If the investigation finds that rules and procedures were broken, they may simply revoke the type certification. The investigation of both the cause of the crash and possible criminal wrongdoings may take years, and until it's over, the Damoclean sword of type certificate revocation will be hanging over every airline that uses the MAX. Will they take that risk?
And the third and most important problem is the way the certification information and data was transferred to other agencies involved, namely, EASA and Transport Canada. They have been humiliated by this whole affair because they trusted FAA to give them true and accurate information to rubber-stamp the certification of MAX. Will they be willing (or allowed) to trust the FAA again and rubber-stamp the approval of whatever software changes Boeing suggests? Or will they demand complete re-certification of the type? And if that happens, will they recognize the "grandfathered" approvals? Mind you, we haven't heard much from CASA who, by the way, was one of the first authorities to ground the type. And that organization is very well-known for its "conservative" approach to aviation safety. Correct me if I'm wrong, but they don't even recognize ETOPS ratings.
In my humble opinion, anyone who expects "a simple software fix" is set to be very disappointed.