Originally Posted by
Ranger One
Someone check my sanity here. From the Seattle Times article:
Good, good.
First, that sentence doesn't make sense; if a signal is known to be "erroneous", surely MCAS shouldn't act at all?! More significantly, my understanding is that MCAS was given the greater control authority because, when the system with the original intended control authority was tested, it was found to be inadequate and still produced handling characteristics that were not certifiable; Boeing had to significantly increase MCAS authority (without properly informing the FAA of the design change!) in order to get the high AoA handling certifiable. So how can they now reduce MCAS authority and retain certification?
I'm starting to wonder if Boeing are going to have to change the airframe, not the software, to produce an acceptable solution.
Might this mean that the airframe is too unsafe in high AoA situations without MCAS, so MCAS cant be allowed to disable itself if input goes unreliable? If the interpretetion is correct that MCAS only decrease its authority and not disable itself in case of erroneous AoA signals?