PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Boeing 737 Max Software Fixes Due to Lion Air Crash Delayed
Old 16th Mar 2019, 00:14
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fdr
 
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Originally Posted by SteinarN
Back to OT.

This is a few questions I have;

Do we know how far from required stall caracteristics the aircraft is without the MCAS?

How serious is this deficiency in (pre) stall characteristics?

How much redundancy, based on the seriousness of the deficiency, will be required by the revised MCAS?

Based on the very old and limited FCC/sensor package/system layout on the 737Max, how much redundancy can feasibly be built into a revised MCAS system?

The issue isn't that stall itself (§ 25.203 Stall characteristics) , if it was, then a pusher would have been mandated. The problem is a longitudinal stability criteria compliance (§ 25.143 General, § 25.145 Longitudinal control, § 25.171 General, § 25.173 Static longitudinal stability, § 25.175 Demonstration of static longitudinal stability (b) and possibly (a)).
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