Yes the Manchester accident changed the way BA handle RTOs - ANY engine failure is treated as a fires and the engine shutdown once the aeroplane has come to a stop (using the Engine Fire Checklist memory action). We train pilots for BA and they also push the "turn towards the dead engine if you have a headwind" philosophy - to blow external fire away from the fuselage.
BA policy is to evacuate ONLY if the Captain believes it to be more dangerous to remain on board (and this really means an uncontained fire). Hot brakes or an engine fire that has been fully extinguished (backed up by visual inspection) would not normally justify and evacuation.
I have only ever had one RTO - engine failure at IAD in a VC10 from 100kt. We had no brake temp gauges but in the absence of obvious problems on a visual inspection we taxied clear.
I have also had one evacuation. This followed a tyre burst in the wheel well at top of descent, leading to ruptured fuel lines, double engine failure, loss of all fuel in the port wing and unknown damage to the maingear in question and fuselage (we in fact had broken the pressure hull, too). We stopped ASAP after landing, were told by the fire crews that we had fuel dripping onto hot brakes and so elected to evacuate. Good news was a pax load of 38 Royal Marines who were calm and organised during evacuation - but don't fancy trying it with 250 men, women, children and drunks.