Play the video below as you read the post.
The biggest issue faced by this and the other crews is trying to figure out what was going on. They had IAS disagree, stickshaker, and intermittent trim runaway only after flap retraction. This was NOT a classic runaway, the runaway did not follow the continuous expectation, it only began after a 5 second period from a manual trim input, then stopped as soon as the trim switch was moved for another 5 seconds. Try workshopping that combination with the published system knowledge that fails to mention that the MCAS even exists, in your second language reading the checklist(s) to figure out your pitch/thrust combination to isolate the failed system, all with this racket in the background.
If you gave this scenario's to 100 crews in the sim, I have no doubt less than 100 would end up turning off the stab trim cutout switches off. Some crews may never have even retracted to flaps to expose the MCAS activation. Unfortunately we won't ever be able to perform the experiment as most 737 MAX pilots are now likely acutely aware of the MCAS and the appropriate deactivation via the stab trim cutout.