an Horrendous reading !
Likely to revive the "depression" debate we had after Germanwings ,as the one on putting MPLs after 150h on the right seat with a senior Cpt not performing .
But she was stressed and probably scared a swell when one read this : " the PIC again requested for the landing checklist for the third time where the FO again confirmed that it had already been completed regardless of the landing gear unsafe tone still stridently audible.
The whole operation seemed to be in disarray :
The proper preflight briefing by the dispatch including the recently introduced Bangladesh ADC number was not carried out
The first APP : All the critical items such as minimum sector altitudes, final approach inbound course, type of approach (CDFA), surrounding terrain with highest obstacle sectors, descent rate requirements, aircraft configuration schedule, speed control, stabilization criteria, missed approach point and procedure, minimum descent altitude and runway lighting etc. were never reviewed.
The PIC kept on assuming that the landing runway was still ahead of them, though the aircraft had already flown through the eastern part of the entire RWY at a position beyond the north east of RWY 20 threshold, approximately 3-4 NM northeast of KTM VOR. Autopilot was disengaged at 1.1 nm east of the VOR.
one oddity ( already mentioned) : PIC post mortem : Carbon Monoxide poisoning as likely cause of death. meaning he was alive after impact and died due to exposition to fumes ?