REASONS TO VOTE AGAINST PROPOSAL 2018

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REASONS TO VOTE AGAINST PROPOSAL 2018
Compiled from the Membership’s analysis

1. Abbreviations:
ARA = Accommodation and Rental Assistance
ASL = Aircrew Services Limited (crewing)
BPP = Bypass Pay
CC = Contract Compliance
CO = Crew Operations
COS = Conditions of Service
FACA = Freighter Aircraft Crewing Agreement
EO = HK Employment Ordinance
HK CPI = HK Consumer Price Index
HPE = High Performance Engagement
IA = Industrial Action
MDC = Minimum Daily Dredit
PROP18 = Proposal 2018
RFZ = Rent Free Zone
RP = Rostering Practices
RIG = Ratio In Guarantee (fair minimum credit
for the time at work on duty/down route)
TB = Training Ban
TU = Trade Union
UA = Umbrella Agreement

2. The agreements in PROP18 are NOT ENDURING:
a. Each agreement can be terminated one way or another by this or any future Company manager, including their unilateral interpretation of a UA violation
b. Each agreement has a defined term after which time they automatically terminate - which leads us right back to starting all over again
c. Definition of a real “enduring” agreement​: the agreement remains unchanged until a mutually agreed replacement is ratified - no termination clause, no fallback to a policy

3. CC + TB do work: Management have put much effort into circumventing its effects with DEFO, 2 x SO LRO, training at KA/Air HK, SI’s doing checking, and demanding such a complex + strong UA.

Examples of staying the course/rejecting a bad deal led to a better outcome ​:
a. 1999 A scale “sign or be fired” fiasco led to high sickness due stress of 3-months’ notice:
i. COS99 enhanced with Scope Clause that management said would “never” happen
ii. B scale much improved salary increase + valuable stock options for some
iii. Beginning of the end of ASL, new joiners on CX COS, no more ASL crew
iv. ASL crew offered “once in a lifetime” chance to join CX (remainder forced in 2008)
v. Disciplinary & Grievance procedure for all was formalized in COS
vi. RP as contractual was promised as a “side letter” to be dealt with later once no more
leverage (​just like PAY18) and RP never happened then Company caused 49ers crisis
(and after the huge cost and fallout to the Company - very little risk of another 49ers)
b. 2003 deal on housing was ​rejected then improved​ and agreed
c. 2004 deal on RP was​ rejected then improved​ and agreed RP04, led to RP07
d. 2005 49ers deal ​rejected then improved​ and agreed for the 12 allowed to return
e. 2007 deal ​rejected then improved​, some pay imposed, none of the detrimental issues imposed
f. 2007 Dragonair deal ​rejected then improved​ and agreed after years of CC::
i. Improvements to Housing (as opposed to our cuts to ARAPA)
ii. Introduction of HKPA for locals (which starts at more than double CX starting rate)
iii. Improvements to flight duty pay (including credit from sign on time)
iv. Improvements to hotels
v. Approx 19% pay increase
g. 2009 GFC/SLS crisis deal ​rejected then improved,​ led to 25-year ARAPA (in theory only)
h. 2014 Pay offer ​rejected then improved​ and agreed after CC

CONS IN GENERAL
1. None of the agreements are enduring, all will automatically terminate vs. automatic continuation of any agreement at the expiration of term until a mutually agreed replacement is implemented - start all over again in each case + fight just to maintain what we already had, but with no future TB leverage
2. Company has only just sent the final agreements​, still being clarified after GC recommendation
3. Enforceability very likely overstated: COS states RP, HKPA and ARAPA are policy, no matter what agreements the Company makes with the HKAOA, including PROP18. Except UA, not in COS
4. 2 SO LRO manning brought in with bad faith during HPE negotiations, DEFO u​ndermining SO’s
5. No rule preventing new COS introduction must be negotiated, to prevent whipsaw and continual dragging down of our COS: COS18 imposed in bad faith during good faith PROP18 negotiations
6. RP07 was canceled to change manning level to force 3-crew LRO, trial failed anyway
7. A JFO upgraded from a current SO is more expensive than a COS18 DEFO, expect more DEFO
8. When future talks lead to an impasse, no agreed and quick binding arbitration process, no deadlines, no timelines, just a hollow promise of mediation or new, undefined “binding arbitration”
9. No absolute clarity on all sides whether the HKAOA actually can legally seek an injunction or arbitration on behalf of pilots (third party rights argument) or ever actually achieve anything - there
are already compelling HKG lawyer-based disagreements about this
10. Agreements we received from HKAOA are not signed by the DFO.​ All were unsigned except UA signed by GMA, ​Company recently claimed GMA signature made JCR Agreement “not” ratified
11. TB has not caused slow upgrades (proof: KA + Air HK training planned and used sparingly)
12. None of the significant savings from CMP efficiency gains being shared with pilots
13. Huge CMP efficiency gains acknowledged by GMA for reduced CC/TB effectiveness, but airline growth with no CC/TB effectiveness was also claimed in GMA, in Update January 10, 2019:
​“CMP has made us far more efficient in the way we deploy our pilots, and our Training team have found ways to become more productive. As a result the airline has grown – and will continue to grow
– exactly to the plan provided by the Commercial division and endorsed by the Board.” However, the # of a/c + pilots has not grown according to negotiator RL, December 20, 2018:
a. “From their own plans mid 2016 they planned to have 160 a/c by end of 2017. We had 148.”
b. “We are losing pilots at the same rate we recruit them. I think we have about 14 more than two years ago.”
c. “Based on...2016 interim report...we were supposed to have 158 a/c by end of 2017 and 163 a/c by end of 2018. You can trawl through 2015 till interim 2018 reports. You will see the
number we are supposed to have decreasing from projections prior to TA16. So IMHO they are reducing the aircraft we have to match the pilots we have.”
d. “Two SO ops does NOT change the total crew requirement - it just changes the composition. As of mid 2016 they were planning to recruit 250 per year for 2017 and 2018. Instead we
recruited 148 in 2017 and 140(so far) in 2018. We were supposed to be experiencing a lot lower attrition rate closer to 2% not our current 5%.”
e. “So by my estimates we should have about 400 pilots more than we have today and about 165 aircraft by years end.”
14. No proper pension scheme: P Fund is just a savings account with very high fees, new-hire COS08 P Fund contribution not fixed (subject to Company policy) and COS18 has set a new, lower benchmark
15. No agreement regarding wet-leasing, such as the current 2 x Atlas B747-8, contracting out our jobs

CONS FOR UMBRELLA AGREEMENT
1. The UA will neuter the HKAOA which would then have no effectiveness to represent members for the foreseeable future due no leverage at all, we should never sign a deal that does that to our union.
Under EO, the employer cannot dictate that, and we must never volunteer it
2. With COS18 introduced, this CC/TB is the likely the last chance to improve COS99/COS08
3. There should be no UA or any peace clause when all the bargaining items have not been agreed (HKPA is still at an impasse, as was Pay until agreed at 0% with 1% fallback, no ancillary items)
4. No value from the imbalanced UA as it handcuffs members for up to 9+ years, management can always violate and end agreements, no financial penalty to them for doing so (cancel PAY18, stop
paying, then what?), we will never be able to use TB effectively again for a generation, no leverage
5. Last chance for an improvement for foreseeable future is by refusing PROP18 to keep leverage: CC/TB will not exist if PROP18 is ratified TB will be permanently rendered impotent
6. This would mean the permanent end of an invested CC/TB campaign with very little reward. There is no guarantee if and when there will be any more or fast upgrades or not, they desperately want 2 x
SOs on all routes, so they need lots more SO, not more FO/CN
7. No possibility of CC/IA for ARAA18: Section 5 throughout UA (including 5.4) states that “any” IA by “HKAOA” (it doesn’t specify “HKAOA GC” like elsewhere in document) and there is a huge
difference between “HKAOA” and “HKAOA GC as “HKAOA” includes any member-initiated CC/IA: “ANY IA” could cancel all PROP18 agreements for term of ARAA18. So, it is not a 9+ year
deal, it is until whenever the majority feel they need IA, which will terminate ARAA18
8. CC would be “available” after terms expire, but Company will never again be entrapped by a TB
9. Cannot accept this UA peace agreement because all bargaining items have not been agreed upon
10. Cannot consent that IA has a new, wider definition. With this UA, IA now includes just following your contract (CC). IA should be actions covered by the HK TU Ordnance that are lawful for a TU
that result in ​not following your contract. Both CC and TB are voluntary/discretionary actions that by withdrawing do not breach the employment contract and therefore should not be considered IA.
11. UA Clause 6 about HKAOA supporting any legal case against the Company endures beyond the term of the UA, “shall survive the termination of this agreement.” How can we possibly accept this?
Why did the management want this? (References the RP07 and ARAPA unilateral cancellations.)
For just one example, SHP is totally unresolved.

CONS FOR PAY18
1. Not enduring - term ends on June 2, 2019, back to square one again without leverage
2. No leverage if agreement is ratified, management would not negotiate a deal even with the previous CC leverage, so why would they negotiate this year after we remove all CC leverage?
3. Agreement is for talks + 0%, even the 1% is not guaranteed: if no mediator available (or agreed) means no mediation means no 1% “following mediation”
4. Nothing is tied to HK CPI​ so no medium or long term assurances
5. No minimum, automatic future indexing after term ends means more protracted negotiations again
6. No back pay to make up for 0% in 2017 or 2018 (other staff got raises + full 13th month), lost TA16’s 2.5% in 2016 + 2.5% in 2017 = 5% missing due mainly due to peace clause overreach
7. No 2019 pay increase, 0% with 1% floor on June 1 but no follow on floors for next years, same battle coming again, and no back pay to January 1, 2019 in fallback
8. No future “fallback" positions at end of PAY18 agreement term (eg. CPI or 2% per year enduring)
9. Not enough pay increments in rank, pilots get stuck at some point on same pay at top of pay scale
10. Never are pilots “HK based staff” for inflationary pay increases, almost always miss out for same or proportional increases or bonuses or ex gratia payments, always targeting pilots for lesser payments
11. No money for pilots but enough for HK Staff/FAU/etc. such as 1% 2017 + 3% 2018 = 4% + 5% above = 9% over 4 yrs (more is lost with compounding)
12. No CC/TB leverage for planned 2019 Pay negotiations if PROP18 ratified
13. No renaming of the “annual discretionary bonus” to original name (and intent) of “13th month” so still missing a contractual, annual 13th month payment (legally required at KA and much of Asia)
14. Provident Fund is not protected for those who signed COS08 with contribution amount subject to policy vs. 15.5%, COS18 benchmark is even worse - expect COS08 policy to drift down unless fixed
15. No requirement for management to cease referring to seniority-based pay increments as pay raises
16. No “just cause” is required for termination, COS says “for any reason”
17. No improvement to achieve a reasonable Disciplinary & Grievance procedure, threat of termination for “any” reason continues to be used to intimidate and manipulate
18. No Statutory Holiday Pay resolution/settlement
19. No Bypass Pay resolution/settlement

CONS FOR RP18
1) Not enduring - supposed to be replace by JCR Global RP soon, but will it ever be?
2) No HKAOA leverage will remain for upcoming 5 TU Global RP talks if PROP18 ratified - HKAOA-specific objectives cannot be achieved with no leverage, only by trading wins away
3) No fallback position after the term ends in 3 years or no mutually agreed replacement before then - key words: “mutually agreed” (paragraph 30), must be enduring
4) May be unilaterally terminated by management if UA is not complied with in their opinion
5) Not same RP07 manning levels returned in RP18, “different crewing levels” can be “trialed” by management until we lose via FRMSC/3rd party contractor assessment
6) No end of 2 x SO LRO - more to come and more delays to JFO upgrades
7) No proper definition of High Density Roster, could be anything and subject to unlimited abuse
8) No indication of High Density Rosters availability, can be barred from it “at Company discretion” which is not explained, no rules, no grievance procedure, no definition = disappointment and abuse
9) No B747-specific LRO or Standard Ops crewing levels or operational buffers due totally different operation/fatigue/disruption issues due so much rostering to max AFTLS
10) No end of “burning out” crew while still in flight - happens every day on B747
11) No J class positioning agreement on KA (only upgrade if space available)
12) N​o J class positioning in all cases on other air carriers, abused because US carriers use term “First” class and the 3-hour condition for J class is circumvented by CO using multiple-sector routing
13) No permanent ban on 2/2/WOCL pairings and no additional required manning
14) No credit for cancelled duties, full flexibility for CO to reassign anything including more free reserve
15) No original intent of O days, no credit for O days and too much flexibility for management
16) No prevention of conversion of O Days to reserve in any case
17) O days and unused R days are not considered a DDO for AFTLs or EO day off
18) O days after reserve = free reserve but do not count toward 30/year free reserve days
19) No improvement to 30 days of free reserve
20) Published R days should be written as “ONLY” rostered 3-6 day blocks (but still should be only 6)
21) No resumption of 6-day blocks of reserve, 3-6 R days plus 1-3 O days means more usable O = more free reserve = same old abuse comes again and previously won battle will have to be fought again
22) No minimum reserve credit/no reserve RIGs
23) No credit for airport or outport reserve
24) No minimum G days prior to reserve or simulators
25) No negotiated/agreed airport reserve system
26) No restriction barring reserve/RT/PC/AL from being first duty after return from leave
27) No increased pay credit for L days to prevent work stacking (should be min 3.8 hrs/day, not 2)
28) No or gravely insufficient pay credit for e-Learning courses
29) No credit for time spent on complying with ever-increasing Company reliance on iPad/EFB updates
30) No correction to eliminate EO 1 day off in 7 abuse (no G day payout, no consent sought for changes)
31) No compensation for late return to home base
32) No Reduced Roster Option (part-time)
33) No taxi reimbursement for late-night arrivals
34) No credit from sign on time or turnarounds/ground time and free delays (no duty RIGs)
35) No additional G or Table X days for B747/A330-only due much more fatigue: no proper RIGs
36) To leave HKG, CO would be able to request captain to reduce the crewing level below the RP to minimum AFTLS, expanding “discretion” subject to intimidation
37) No Vacancy Bidding System for fair, seniority-based access to all open positions
38) MDC not a proper RIG, is not calculated daily to force fair pay/better pairings, only offered because it will almost never trigger anyway, 1 year of CMP rosters have shown pairings are not constrained
by MDC at offered rate, virtually worthless/disingenuous, rate must be higher to function correctly
39) No MDC for office, sim, ground, distance learning duties
40) No proper Duty and Trip RIGs: either fly the pilots or pay them to sit around down route
41) No B747 specific RIGs due lower block time with long duties and more downroute non-flying time
42) No “Rostered or better” credit. Rosters flexibility has to cost money, credit should never go down
43) No end to the stealing back of EFP for virtually any reason
44) No G day callout pay when annual leave is used for any recovery period
45) No G day callout pay when G or L day is lost due to down route disruption
46) No G or L day lost down route has to be be returned and rostered later at the pilot’s discretion
47) No accepted definition of the word “normally” (nor the removal of it)
48) No improvements to mutual exchange/proffer approval rules/conditions
49) No improvements for us regarding 3-crew operations, subject to expansion/unlimited trials and abuse
50) Automatic consent to freighter positioning abuse with unreasonable conditions, despite full credithours - even passenger crew can expect to/from NAM or EUR on B747 via 1-2 stops (maybe without
bunk available due abuse, crap seat, no service, SO’s sleeping on floor, etc.)
51) No defined method for remaining on current RPP15 to avoid RP18’s positioning on the freighter
52) No need to submit to “side letter” Extended Outport Reserve “voluntary” trial at ANC
53) No agreed rules or full definition for Extended Outport Reserve, planned at 10-day pairing for ANC trial, wide open to abuse, no guaranteed days off other than minimum Table X, no guaranteed credit
or allowances, virtually certain to become “involuntary” and to expand to more bases and passenger fleet, no credit, reducing need for basings
54) No protection from work stacking around Extended Outport Reserve because there is no minimum credit/no duty RIG/insufficient MDC averaged over the month, encouraging more work stacking
55) Less flexible minimum days between Joker and G days, increased from 5 to 7 days separation
56) No increase in G or O days despite reduced layover length and shorter, more productive pairings from CMP, just more work and less allowances
57) No free in-flight WIFI when PX
58) No ability to bid below your rank for a based position (i.e. CN for bidding FO slot)
59) Nothing stopping CN flying as FO (i.e. right seat qualified line captains) = less JFO upgrades
60) No policy/protection/BPP if any COS99 RA55 crew extend/sign over to COS18 RA65
61) Less restful layovers than cabin crew continue (eg. HKG-SYD-HKG can give cabin crew five G days, standard cabin crew LRO/ULRO layover 1 day longer than flight crew, etc.) No need to
consent to immense AFTLS concessions in management-requested variations side letter, which is all about making things more convenient and flexible for the management while taking away
protections from us, each of which is a slippery slope to a guaranteed permanent rule change:
a) Significant changes to 900-hr rule will increase flexibility and productivity (daily vs. monthly lookback) plus, unfairly, the 900-hr limit only applies when departing “home base”
b) Reduction of Table X mandatory recovery days allowed if pilot consents - rather than adding O or G days to allow for disruption and stabilize rosters, the min # of Table X days could be
“waived” and reduced to preserve next pairing, subject to abuse and pressure

CONS HKPA18
1. Not enduring
2. HKPA18 was not agreed upon, ​it was offered b​y management, and the GC still recommended ratification, jeopardizing approx 60% of the membership
3. COS18 HKPA has set the new, lower benchmark to expect for all future negotiations, for example captains to receive 6000-9000HKD less.
4. We have been in CC for HKPA but ratification would be an enormous concession below minimum
5. The HKPA deal does not provide enough value considering the very high + increasing cost of living
6. Not​ tied to HK CPI or rental index
7. HKPA survey data min acceptable HKPA was determined to be 10K increase to all (closer to KA)
8. HKPA increase in TA18 is approx 50% less value than TA16 instead of more, and no back pay
9. Child Education Allowance outside HKG set at 70k, is not indexed, is less than TA16, fixed amount will erode and require renegotiations, far below 90% HKG ESF rates
10. GMA claimed this is an enduring agreement in Update January 17, 2019: “Following the expiry oftha t agreement we have committed to maintaining HKPA at the increased levels until new levels are
agreed.” However, no guarantee long after he is replaced because HKPA18 states it is not enduring:
a. Clause 1.1: “This Agreement will terminate upon the expiry of the Term unless otherwise mutually agreed by the Parties.”
b. Clause 1.2. “Notwithstanding the above, the Company may terminate this Agreement unilaterally and immediately by means of written notice to the Association where the Association fails to comply with any of its obligations in clause 5 of the Umbrella Agreement dated [ ].”
c. Clause 3.3 says this agreement promises the Company will keep the new rates going after this agreement is terminated, except for early termination, but as long as there is a termination
clause then this agreement will terminate, including the 3.3 clause to keep paying the attached rates.

CONS ARAA18
1. Not enduring
2. No “certainty” at all for 9-10 years, section 7.3 refers to cancellation for violating UA for any agreement in first 18 months, and either side could do that and ARA goes back to policy
3. Repeat from UA: No possibility of CC/IA for ARAA18: Section 5 throughout UA (including 5.4) states that “any” IA by “HKAOA” (it doesn’t specify “HKAOA GC” like elsewhere in document,
and there is a HUGE difference between “HKAOA” and “HKAOA GC”) as “HKAOA” includes any member-initiated CC/IA: “ANY IA” could cancel ALL PROP18 agreements for ARAA18 term (9+)
4. Many incidents of robbing Peter to pay Paul: HKPA goes up, ARAA goes down
5. Major monetary and/or standard of living concessions for pilots on Level 1 rate
6. Major monetary concessions for pilots on RFZ remaining in serviced apartments (and/or 10% reduction in benefit = 1000’s of HKD)
7. Major monetary concession for longstanding agreement to include serviced apartments, now incurring 22% cost vs. the current 8%: 12% plus 10% serviced apartment = 22% =14% lost
8. Still not really 25-year housing and not as explained/agreed in 2009, many limitations and restrictions now included. ​Example: an Officer leases a serviced apartment at HK$90,000 per
month. The 10% reduction equates to HK$9,000. The Company’s contribution is (88% times HK$90,000) less HK$9,000 for a total of reimbursement of HK$70,200.
9. Major punitive restrictions for extending past 15 years is applied on what allowance we will get if one hops out of the mortgage scheme, and after 20 years you go down to basic 24K
10. No increase in basic rate of 24K, same since since 1992, no increase or indexation 2019 to 2028
11. Despite 10 years added with SLS deal change to COS08 RA65, unable to reselect variable vs. fixed allowance, a decision made long ago with RA55 in mind
12. GMA Update January 14, 2019: “This gives eligible crew a high degree of surety over the terms of their accommodation support until 30 September, 2028.” However, regarding the “high degree of
surety” (​not​ 100% surety) the recipients will always be easily outnumbered by HKPA members, setting up a future Peter to pay Paul divide and conquer, with “HKAOA” as a party, clause 6.1
“...either party to the Agreement may give notice of its intention to renegotiate any particular clause or paragraph…” that could lead to a majority vote to amend ARAA18 by those unaffected.

CONS, ADDITIONAL
1. No improvement to rapidly degrading medical benefits
2. No introduction of real dental benefits
3. No improvement reducing exorbitant staff travel J and F prices - should not be a revenue source
4. Nothing to improve any of the horrible policies: Staff travel, FOC tickets, Sickness, Absence Management, Privacy issues (PICS/MICS)
5. No improvement to AOD disciplinary policy (i.e. first offence: termination)
6. No proper fix to horrible crew meals, snacks, quality or ability to order ahead/standing order
7. No proper compassionate leave policy, can be a very stressful unknown when it is needed

A WAY FORWARD AFTER A VOTE AGAINST PROPOSAL 18
UNIFY - HOLD THE LINE - NEW DOCTRINE - COUNTER PROPOSAL - WAIT - ESCALATE

The reasons for such an objectionable proposal despite CC:
1. Chairman and GC weakness for talks to get any deal, appalling decisions, capitulated repeatedly
2. Our GC failed to foster + escalate CC, allowed CO to work around plus extra efficiency of CMP
3. Company was claiming major financial losses: redundancies and restructuring, chasing concessions
4. No expansion of # of a/c or pilots: moving several A330’s to KA, minimal training on B777 fleet, wet lease of 2 x B747’s, intro of 2-SO LRO, and vast CMP pairing efficiencies all reduced CC effect

We must act differently and increase leverage with disciplined CC: (short of striking, review this later)
1. Strongly hold the line together under a new, revitalized, unified and driven leadership team
2. Fully support CC escalation if needed (many options) and tolerate any associated short-term sacrifice
3. Fully eliminate all CC violations and refuse to tolerate any violators undermining our campaign
4. Create/await more favourable situation, present management with our Proposal 2019, remain patient
5. Achieve long-term peace automatically from fair, rewarding agreements + proper career satisfaction

Motions are to be put forward quickly to change our union’s course that will need to be:
1. Proposed by diligent members to rectify our union and strategy and to set substantial objectives
2. Supported by 10% of the membership to force a vote - if not, no progress
3. Carried by a majority vote of the membership - if not, no progress

Motions to compel the GC and membership to put forward a more fair pre-ratified Proposal 2019:
1. Remove + replace many ineffective, divisive, acquiescent leaders incompatible with the membership
2. Rebuild a productive, compelling and formidable GC working for the membership, not against
3. Offer to reinstate GC members who resigned in protest of the leadership that brought us PROP18
4. Escalate CC as agreed upon, with unity, strength and determination until we close a worthwhile deal
5. No more bundled deals or union-neutering umbrella agreements, consider cancelling the GFBFA
6. Fix Rule 20.4 and no deals with Peter to pay Paul or divide-and-conquer management tactics
7. Prioritize respectful, realistic, fair and permanently indexed financial compensation to achieve:
a. Back pay due through a significant signing bonus for huge long term losses from being so disrespected and abused for so long regarding pay and HKPA
b. Long-term pay deal with annual increases tied to HK CPI indexation, and enduring
c. HKPA equal or better than KA, and enduring
d. HK CPI or rental indexation of HKPA, and enduring
e. Contractual 13th month every year and back pay for 2017’s 35k maximum, enduring

Quickly implement changes to rules and strategies (many more to come after these are enacted)​:
1. Move forward toward achieving a very large number of genuine, meaningful, valuable wins
2. Re-educate, reinforce and escalate CC/TB plus much more significant withdrawal of goodwill
3. Strong and effective policing of CC (not like previous GC) for a much more successful campaign
4. IFALPA recruitment ban, anti-COS18 PR campaign, consider adding COS18 to CC
5. Launch significant lobbying to HK Govt/CAD authorities + PR campaign (to management, too)
6. Set up RP/AFTLS/ASRF/UF advisory subcommittee hotline and FAQ, to strictly end goodwill
7. No more non-disclosure agreements or excessive secrecy or muzzling of dissenting GC members
8. Get meaningful RPs through Global RP talks - no peace agreement handcuffs, with leverage intact
9. Refocus the objectives of the AOA and reduce the workload on GC members (use staff/contracting)