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Old 22nd Oct 2003, 00:23
  #211 (permalink)  
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Gaunty
Much has been learned by ALL parties about timing and consultation and there is a common determination that there will be a more efficient process using these lessons in going forward from here.
Much was already learned the last time. Part of the Class G demonstration failure was the fact that its implementation was driven by dates and not the other way around. LAMP was a result of the lessons learned. LAMP did not specify a date for implementation of procedures until the consultation was completed, education and training requirements were identified and signed off as part of the safety case. (It also had a design safety case). Why are we "learning" these lessons again?

When the process is driven by implementation dates (like NAS is), education, training, and the procedures themselves are all vulnerable to last minute changes which affect their efficacy. Regardless of whether the new system is safer or not, the need to get the training material out in a reasonable amount of time is crucial to have it introduced safely.

So why don't we all just get on with it and show each other how mutual cooperation, common sense and professional attitudes can overcome the inevitable wrinkles that will appear and in six months time or earlier if necessary we can have another look.
Again, if the process was not so driven by implementation dates, alot of the wrinkles wouldn't even be there. I take wrinkles to mean smalll problems with the system (training, phraseology, airspace design etc), but we all know that small problems can play a major part in the causes of an accident. Why not overcome the wrinkles beforehand if they have already been identified? Why "have another look" later when we can have a look now?

For example, I know of no-one who believes that the removal of frequencies from VNCs and frequency boundaries from ERC Lows will lead to a safer system than we now have. In fact, most would say that it is patently less safe. I listed scenarios in an earlier post which showed how important knowledge of the correct area frequency is. No-one here could demonstrate otherwise. The frequency issue is a known "wrinkle" - why should we wait 6 months for it to be ironed out when it is identifiable now? What is the fatal attraction to getting a procedure in place when problems have been identified with it?

The implementation process is not more important than the safety of the system. There should be no "let's get it in now and fix it later" attitude - there is no place for that in aviation. No professional would ever support an implementation process that put itself above safety.

You can be sure that ATCers and pilots will do their best to work with the new procedures, as they have done so in the past, even if many disagree with them. It is here that you will see the "mutual cooperation, common sense and professional attitudes" that enhances the system we all operate under.
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