Originally Posted by
Horatio Leafblower
This is "interesting".
IMHO a few large holes in this report.
Agreed. Some details that don't stack up:
climbed to a cruising altitude of 7,500 ft in visual meteorological conditions. At about 1816, the pilot slightly reduced power and began descending the aircraft for Cessnock. At about 1821, he felt the aircraft yaw toward the right and observed the right engine indications showing a loss of power...
... an expected freezing level of 7,000 ft....
.... At the time of the engine failure, the aircraft was descending through, and just below, the forecast freezing level
..for those figures to dovetail the pilot would have to have been using 100fpm for his descent. Hmm.
And it goes on, labelling the "approximate conditions at time of engine failure" on the graph at 4 degrees, as opposed to "descending through, and just below, the forecast freezing level".
No reference to a drop in MAP or change of yaw trim that one would expect as a warning sign before the noticeable yaw.
Also in the narrative it is written that the pilot advanced the throttles and props as an immediate action. And yet shortly after it states that he did not select full power on the good engine until after securing the failed engine and subsequently noticing that he could not maintain altitude at Vyse.
And "The ATSB did not conduct an inspection of the propeller feathering system or engine".
All in all, not a great report. Rather cursory as so often with GA accidents.