Dick. You are pushing a barrow. Leave ETOPS (however we name it) to professionals. There has never been a better researched and analysed piece of aviation than ETOPS except . CASA didn't start it. Australia's rules are little different than anyone elses. Industry professionals live the well-understood "chronic unease" wondering what single point of failure problem might have been thus far un-noticed. Could even be two pilots getting their (contaminated) coffee from the same coffee stall before departure and both becoming disabled at the same time. Why not carry a third pilot just in case? If dual un-related engine failures (and then consequences thereof) were the only problem left to solve we would all be smiling. Dual but related engine failures can happen on any flight.
You know as well as anyone that "Safety" has never been the same as "Assurance" or "Guarantee". How about you read Annex 6 and Annex 19 and get back to your readership? You might notice these points:
- Controlled risk and controlled error is acceptable in an inherently safe system.
- Safety is a systems property, it can only be determined for the whole system under consideration.
- Safety constraints need to be enforced at all system levels. SMS provides the framework for this to happen in a systematic way.
Exclaiming surprise that you alone have found something that no-one else has and that therefore CASA is at fault and the Act must be changed might make you feel good but does nothing for the real world.