edmundronald, PJ,
Modern technology and analytical methods are very good at evaluating the past; ‘what happened’, but not so good as explaining ‘why’, or what might be done to reduce the likelihood of further occurrence.
A widespread statistical evaluation might identify local hazards - deteriorating runway surface, poor drainage, on specific runways. However, if the analysis shows a widespread reduction is safety margin (challenges to the regulatory assumptions - ‘work as done is not the same as work as imagined’), then how will the industry react.
Predictive calculation and guidance can help before landing, but this would still be limited by the quality of incoming information - runway braking action, extent of contamination.
Reactive warnings when the aircraft is on the runway should have more accurate data, but if the landing has been well planned, then at best any ‘on the runway actions’ might only suggest the optimum way of using the remaining safety margins, which may already be insufficient.
Many problems have been addressed with revised landing distance calculations (OLD /FOLD) - providing they are used. Additional hazards (lower safety margins) on wet runways have already been identified, but defences remain within the frailties of human evaluation; ground measurements, reporting, choice of performance and levels of braking / reverse.
Heeding ‘Amalberti’s’ views on highly a reliable industry, we must be careful not to disturb the delicate balance which contributes to modern safety.
Beware calls for more EMAS or other technologies, because ‘it saved the day’. Such systems are indicators of upstream problems; these must first be understood and fixed before resorting to ‘engineered’ solutions.
What if EMAS gives crews a subconscious feeling of safety, we ‘drift’ to operate closer to existing (scant) margins of safety; which might become the norm.