I'm not going to go over old posts, but merely point people to the 'Review of ACO Flying and Gliding' report of 1 December 2012. Do a simple word search for 'safety'. 21 references, most suggesting 'safety enhancements'. Specifically (given a recent post) it recommends these be progressed quite separately from the planned engine replacement. If one is to compartmentalise this case, then that report is a good starting point.
I feel there is sometimes a tendency to go after a certain individual, at the expense of the historical facts and wider picture. I don't know the man concerned and cannot comment. But I do know a few of the 2 Stars who were personally warned as to the impact of ignoring mandated airworthiness regulations, and making draconian cuts to the implementation budget. As Engines has often said, few if any set out to deliberately cause harm. But if someone is warned by experts in the field that their actions will cause harm (to persons or, in this case, fleets of aircraft), and they continue with their actions, there is a conscious element to that decision. If they plead ignorance, then they are in the wrong job - which I accept is prevalent in MoD. These sometimes malicious acts go back a very long way, and there is little separation between the aircraft affected at the time and gliders. If you want to go back just one step from gliders, look at the serious offences committed in the Hawk XX177 case, which shares (shared?) the same Type Airworthiness Authority as gliders. That's the date pushed back to 2010. And so on, through an unbroken line of maladministration going back to June 1987. There I stop, because before that date, while there were problems, they were mostly dealt with properly. There may not have been all the funding necessary, but there was acceptance of the problem, proper risk assessment, and considered acceptance of risk. June 1987 is when the policy to save money at the expense of safety commenced.