The 'Pilot' piece aligns with a (generally helpful to the RAF) view that the problem was caused by failures by civilian contractors, which were discovered by the RAF. Simply not true. The 'pause' followed a December 2013 MAA audit of 2FTS, not an 'RAF engineering audit of civilian company Serco". Indeed, the MAA audit noted that proper engineering audits hadn't been carried out by 2FTS and other Mod/RAF departments.
For clarity:
The newly formed 2 & 3 FTS CAMO team instigated an audit of all 2 FTS (newly formed in Jan 2014) glider engineering operations as part of their ‘stand up’ programme. The findings of that audit led them to craft DHAN 86 which was the formal recommendation to pause flying:
(https ://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491324/20150121-FOI08296Attachment.pdf)
The MAA were then invited to review their work given the severity of the findings.