jimtx, you mistakenly associate the successful outcome as an indication that the crew took the correct action, i.e. that they understood the situation.
It is just as likely, or more so, that they formed ‘a strong but wrong’ belief that the AoA and IAS alerts - the airdata was interfering with STS, so trim was disabled. This was after they had followed the drills for UAS, and ALT Disagree. See report p 21.
The accident crew could similarly have concentrated on the air-data problems and were managing the conflicting stick-shake and low speed awareness, with the different airspeed indications - as did the previous crew.
However, thereafter with flap retraction and trim problems, the latter crew held an equally ‘strong but wrong’ belief that UAS was the dominant issue. Again refer to the report re ATC and speed / height checks p 23.
Outcome knowledge does not reflect the quality of the decision - hindsight bias.