There have been several posts relating to training and the need for MCAS in training simulators. But what would the training consist of, to what purpose ?
The need to demonstrate the normal MCAS trim movement would not be essential based on the experience of pilots and operators of the large number of aircraft already in service. Who of them questioned that the trim was moving ‘in the wrong’ direction, who asked Boeing, checked manuals, questioned Pprune, etc. Apparently none.
The MCAS trim is the system’s visible output, which ‘fails’ due to input errors (AoA, speed, thrust ?) or switching logic (flap, WoW ?). In this accident, trim movement was consequential to flap retraction, before that all indications related to stick-shake, air-data (IAS, ALT) disagree, low speed awareness, and a FEEL DIFF PRESS alert.
The immediate flight task requires establishing a reliable speed indication - cross check and compare with standby speed, and the validity of the stick-shake. ‘Is there a speed error or is the aircraft approaching stall’.
Only thereafter, and depending on what was concluded above, the crew would have to inhibit the trim before retracting flaps. The cue for this is the particular combination of alerts, low speed awareness, and continuing stick-shake, i.e. an AoA vane problem, which in the MAX can affect MCAS. This discounts any effect of false AoA on speed correction / computation - (more info required)?
Thus the training task for AoA input errors with flaps down is primarily understanding the situation; air-data and low speed, or air-data, AoA, stick-shake. Fly the aircraft via the most reliable data, and use manual (mechanical trim).
MCAS trim only comes into play in situations with with flap up. If the AoA is a sudden onset, then all of the air-data issues and stick-shake as above still apply, together with the need to determine instrument accuracy vice real stall - fly the aircraft. Only subsequently would MCAS issues appear.
MCAS trim like STS and Mach TRIM, is un-commanded and intermittent. Only the PF has knowledge of aircraft feel and its relationship to manual electric trim.
In parallel with these effects the crew could have autopilot disengagement, or need to manage external contributions associated with the AoA problem, e.g. bird-strike, icing. There could be many simultaneous demands on mental resource and continuing stick-shake distraction.
The description of the ‘runaway stabiliser’ emergency drill could help understand the situation, but this first requires determining that the trim has ‘runaway’. The drill title is misleading if related to MCAS, trim movement is not continuous, and in order to differentiate between the various un-commanded trim inputs it might be necessary to observe the trim for up to 30 sec; two cycles of MCAS, give or take manual inputs - establishing trim control or not.
Whatever situation is established, or even if uncertain, inhibiting trim is either required or is an acceptable precaution. Thereafter the aircraft is flown with manual (mechanical trim).
Thus the training need is to establish and understand the situation, where the same or similar indications will relate to, or can be misinterpreted as other situations, e.g. independent air-data failure, UAS, or approaching a “real’ stall.
It may be necessary to demonstrate several situations in order to clearly differentiate between the critical one and choose an appropriate drill.
Depending on the situational context then MCAS might not be the most urgent concern, e.g. stick-shake after rotate, unreliable airspeed, and distractions with several simultaneous alerts.
Most if not all of these apply to previous versions of the 737, thus should be understood; in addition the key points do not require MCAS to be installed to replicated accurately except for demonstrating the difficulties in understanding the situation. The need to inhibit the trim in the presence of other alerts and indications is only a MAX problem, and once a correct understanding is achieved the action is simple.
Add to that some practice in manual flying without electric trim, and need to manage surprise, control of attention, and fly the aircraft.