infrequentflyer789, #1637. Interesting; very useful descriptions and analysis in the link at #1634, and to other web pages. Also from Tech Log discussion.
These points address previous questions re the EFIS display of erroneous AoA (if fitted), possibly misleading low speed awareness, and obviously stick shake, all before MCAS became active. (Hazards and mind-shaping problems before MCAS cycles the trim).
The suppositions about flap selection are pertinent. If the crew were managing the false stick shake (low airspeed indication from takeoff onwards), then the subsequent flap cycle could be a logical response to the additional MCAS trimming.
Later supposition is reasonable based on the systems descriptions and MCAS logic. With the trim issue apparently under control, but still cycling, the focus of fault finding may have reverted to stick shake and low speed awareness - UAS (was that written up in previous tech-log entries). This may have involved change of control and concluding a misidentified stall (cf reversed AF 447 mentality) thus thrust addition, allowing the nose to lower and speed increase, before the trim, stick force, increasing airspeed prevented recovery.
The views on dual architecture (link) are similarly interesting. IIRC in the THY accident the aircraft did not have the FCC software mod which would have disconnected the AP AT with RA Failure (other aircraft did), no RA disagree alert due to lack of dual architecture.
Perhaps a similar design issue with a single AoA input to FCC / MCAS, in what is an essentially dual aircraft.
previous link
https://www.satcom.guru/2018/11/firs...ight-data.html