Originally Posted by
Derfred
This would not happen in any decent airline.
Perhaps. But it is much better to have an aircraft where this
cannot happen at any airline.
There are always multiple factors, and if either of them can be fixed, it reduces the total risk of a similar accident. Saying, "Oh, the system was ok, a good pilot and a could airline would not have had any problems" is not helpful. Neither is saying "There was a flight crew who could handle it, so just these bad pilots couldn't."
There are two points to make:
- I seem to recall that on the first flight with divergent AoA values, the Flight Control Computer operated the MCAS based on the correct AoA sensor, so there was no problem for the pilots (except the stick shaker: continuing with that is also a very ... interesting decision), whereas on the accident flight, the MCAS used the faulty AoA sensor so continued to trim nose-down. It did not do so on the previous flight. So yes, in this case the airline not rectifying the problem was a causal factor, but it is just as credible that this could have happened on the first flight on which the fault appeared, and then the airline would have no part in this.
- Pilots without exceptional skills must be able to handle an aircraft with a single technical fault. That is a certification requirement, which one may argue was violated by this design.
Cheers,
Bernd