Partly agreed, and probably Boeing needs to accept some culpability with MCAS redundancy/fault tolerance, but with good maintenance and training it’s likely this thread wouldn’t exist.
Unlike many posters here, I seriously doubt that a crew that couldn’t handle this event would have behaved any differently if an MCAS description had been included in the B737MAX FCOM. I suspect that this aircraft did not crash due to lack of pilot system knowledge regarding MCAS.
Is it a coincidence that a low cost carrier such as this one was the first to discover that MCAS+AOA FAULT+PILOT FAULT= CRASH?
Of course, they didn’t discover it at first, they had to keep putting the aircraft up there with different pilots until they found pilots who couldn’t handle it.
Despite a report not yet being published, the information available indicates that the aircraft had a fault which thankfully, due to good pilots, returned to earth safely. The airline returned the aircraft to the air not once but three times with the fault not verified to be resolved. The pilots of flight number 4 were not able to fly it back safely. You can point at Boeing for system design, but you can’t point at them for this sequence of events. This
would not happen in any decent airline.
And despite your protestations, Boeing does have a word to say about maintenance standards and training standards at an airline wishing to operate their hardware.
Not to the the extent that prevents a low-cost carrier from operating a poorly maintained jet with a poorly trained crew. That is not Boeing’s job. That role rests with the Airline and the local regulatory authority .
I maintain my point.