Was there really no way to have an AofA oversight system, that could detect a malfunctioning AofA indicator? Could they not have a comparitor system, that detected a sensor conflict and disabled MCAS? Single sensor input and actioning was ok, when it merely operated a stick-shaker - pilots can deal with that. But now the single malfunctioning sensor is operating the flight controls....! Did anyone think of the consequenses?
Do Boeing really design a stall-trim system that can operate to full-forward trim? Really? When do we EVER give full forward trim? Should not the system have operated until a certain (safe) forward limit was reached, and stopped there? Why allow MCAS so much authority over the controls?
Silver
Thats about it in a nutshell.That will be in the report 100%.Leaving only a)how/why the crew didnt have enough cognitive function to disengage those trim switches and b)strong focus on Lionairs maincontrol procedures and competency.Answer to (a) can only be startle factor caused by the false alarms(stick shaker).If the Birgenair crew had been able to
quickly cut out the two opposing alarms(shaker vs overspeed) they would not have crashed.No doubt in my mind.Answer to (b) we've visited many times before in accident investigation....