Originally Posted by
roundsounds
I’ll be interested to see the factual reports on:
- maintenance history regarding previous similar / related faults
- What fault indications were presented to the operating crew on this flight per the FDR
- what actions were completed by the crew in response to the indications
- what training, both initial and recurrent, was given by the operator on UAS and runaway stabiliser
It would seem what happens behind the scenes systems wise the 737 requires the same responses from crew for both UAS and runaway stab in NG and Max variants? Whether the stab issue be an actual runaway or a response to a UAS and stall protection, the crew response would be the same for an NG or Max. How would knowledge of a system affect the crew response, the message in the FAA and Boeing docs both reinforce the existing Boeing memory item actions.
I'll be interested to see the factual reports on
- the training records of the flight crew, especially in regard to using the trim cut out procedure
- the records about the maintenance organization and its actions and culture and how it was possible to release the plane fit to fly with IAS disagree, stick shaker on, trim runaway, after a simple vane exchange, or even worse, without any action before the last flight, as the aircraft lost its redundancy
- the log book entries by the crew flying the aircraft on the last 3 sectors, which obviously were not sufficient to address the problem to mtc and the subsequent crew, so this was mentally prepared what could happen
- the certification documents that allow a no majority capable dual sensor system to manipulate essential flight controls and leaves it to the flight crew to identify what might be wrong
It seems much comes down to training, organization, leadership, documentation, culture in the airline, the FAA and Boeing.