Clearly I missed it last year but only found the FlightGlobal article today - my apologies to one and all!
However, (1) this type of incident is, unfortunately, fairly common. (2) Mistakes when entering data are easy to make, and I realise, with the use of derated power, neither is it always so easy to recognise what is a normal power setting - it has become more complicated since my day. (3) I also realise that a pilot's subjective appreciation of acceleration is not reliable, and take-off monitoring systems are difficult to engineer. But (4) I find it very hard to understand why the pilots did not increase power once a problem had been detected - and that they did not do so until 4kms from the end of the runway and at 800ft aal.
With both engines working, it is not as though they needed to beware of VMCG and VMCA, both of which can be a factor following an engine failure on take-off. Is it yet another case of lack of basic stick and rudder skills?