Originally Posted by
MPN11
Let us not forget the RAF Regt mini-tanks. It was/is all about defending the airfield perimeter, and beyond. I subscribe to the idea of 'specialism', but just wonder whether the back-up infrastructure justifies the costs.
4th Battalion the Blankshires, suitably equipped and trained on a permanent basis, could do the same tasks without the 'baggage' of an RAF Regt Depot and associated MoD or HQ Air staffing.
I know it's heresy, and I apologise, but in the smaller UK Mil we have today there are surely savings to be made.
But you identify the rub here MPN11; the Army rotates its units on the Arms Plot basis, and so the Blankshires wouldn't be in role for very long before rotating to other duties and then their successor unit would have to start from scratch again, ad infinitum. The very reason for the formation for the RAF Regiment in 1942 was that Army commanders didn't see airfield defence batallions as essential troops but more as an uncommitted reserve and, retaining full command, would relocate them without any permission from the RAF, often when the situation was at its most dire - read the history books about the fall of Crete. The removal of Army airfield defence units to the beaches left the airfield open to airborne assault, resulting in the beach holding troops being bombed and strafed from German aircraft which were being refuelled at the captured airheads.
I'm not going to chunter on about the RAF Regiment being trained and equipped for specialist operations at squadron level (even though it is true) whereas the Army is organised at much larger Battle Group level. When the Army took over ground defence role at Akrotiri, they replaced the RAF Regiment squadron of 160 men with a company of 120. This grew, by small increments, until they had 230 personnel on the same task, but without the specialist training, observation aids and communications set up. Once they fully appreciated the requirement, they were quite keen to hand the task back, but by then 34 Sqn RAF Regiment had relocated to Leeming and they just had to 'stag on'.
BTW, the Rapier decision was against all operational effectiveness and reason but there was no gainsaying the decision to hand over the capability to the Royal Artillery; a VSO explained it to me as ' it is the RAF's turn to lose the argument and we just have to suck it up and move on, if we are to get away with winning the arguments in retaining more strategic air roles.' You win some, you lose some; SDR-type decisions are always more political than defence orientated...
PS: The Regiment hasn't operated 'mini tanks' CVR(T) since the early 1990s. They have also got rid of Bofors guns and handed in their Lee-Enfields.
PPS: With sensible area defence, I've found that the EFI did actually defend itself quite reasonably!